ORIENTALISM IN EURO-AMERICAN AND INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY:
Historical Representations of “Natives” in Colonial and Postcolonial Contexts

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The author examines the historical role of Euro-American psychology in constructing Orientalist representations of the natives who were colonized by the European colonial powers. In particular, the author demonstrates how the power to represent the non-Western “Other” has always resided, and still continues to reside, primarily with psychologists working in Europe and America. It is argued that the theoretical frameworks that are used to represent non-Westerners in contemporary times continue to emerge from Euro-American psychology. Finally, the author discusses how non-Western psychologists internalized these Orientalist images and how such a move has led to a virtual abandonment of pursuing “native” forms of indigenous psychologies in Third World psychology departments.

For more than 100 years, Euro-American psychology has essentially provided the raw material from which the psychological portraits of the non-Western “Other” have been drawn. Key forerunners of psychology professionals, such as Darwin (1871/1888), Hall (1904), and Spencer (1851/1969), played an important role in implicitly providing philosophical and “scientific” evidence to demonstrate the innate mental inferiority of non-Westerners and the essential mental superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race. Such evidence was used by the political leaders of Europe to justify and rationalize the colonial oppression of their non-Western subjects. For example, Thomas Babington Macaulay (1972), a colonial British statesman, essayist, and policy reformer, wrote the following in the Macaulay Minute regarding Indian education:

I am quite ready to take the Oriental learning at the valuation of Orientalists themselves. I have never found one among them who could deny that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia. The intrinsic superiority of Western literature is, indeed, fully admitted by those members of the Committee who support the Oriental plan of education. (p. 241)

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About 20 years ago, Said’s (1979) book *Orientalism* highlighted the different ways the colonists created and justified their image of the Orient as primitive, backward, exotic, and uncivilized. He argued that the European colonial administrators deliberately created an “archive of information” in Europe to carve out the image of the Orient because “from 1815 to 1914 European direct colonial dominion expanded from 35% of the earth’s surface to about 85% of it” (Said, 1979, p. 41). Said (1979) argued that four important “dogmas” were used by Europeans to perpetuate the Orientalist idea that the East was in desperate need of Western civilization. The first dogma was based on the idea that there is an absolute, essential, and systematic difference between the rational, highly developed West and the primitive and uncivilized East. The second Orientalist dogma refers to the idea that European representations of the “Other” were often based on a selective reading of texts and documents that were part of the Orient’s ancient and classical civilization.

The third dogma described the Orient as “incapable of defining itself,” thereby giving Western scholars full license to formulate a homogeneous description of the “Other.” The fourth dogma, according to Said (1979, p. 301), was based on the point of view that the Orient had to be feared or controlled through means of research or colonial occupation. Above all, the point Said (1979) wanted to highlight is that Orientalism is not a thing of the past. Orientalism as a way of life and “its institutions and all-pervasive influence, [last] up to the present” (p. 45).

In the last 30 years, many scholars and researchers have analyzed in depth the role that disciplines such as anthropology (Asad, 1973; Clifford & Marcus, 1986), history and English literature (Bhabha, 1994; Said, 1979; Spivak, 1993), and science (Adas, 1989; Alvares, 1980; Prakash, 1999) have played in contributing to the effective implementation of the Orientalist vision formulated by the European colonial powers.

In the last 20 years, psychologists publishing in the English language have made some scattered attempts at looking at the ways in which psychology and its subfields have, directly or indirectly, furthered the cause of European imperialism in colonial and postcolonial contexts (Nandy, 1995; Vaidyanathan, 1989; Vaidyanathan & Kripal, 1999). Similarly, there have been occasional in-depth analyses of the connections between colonialism, Western psychology, and the development of indigenous psychologies in individual countries and continents, such as China (Ho, 1988), the Philippines (Enriquez, 1993), Latin America (Ardila, 1982), and India (D. Sinha, 1986). Overall, however, the scholarship within psychology that specifically deals with the historical role of psychology in unconsciously or consciously strengthening and reinforcing the Orientalist vision of the European colonial powers has been sparse.

In this article I analyze how some pioneers of psychology unknowingly cultivated Orientalist images of the non-Western “Others” as inferior, primitive individuals and how this legacy of the West defining the “Other” continues to occur today. It is important to mention at the outset that I do not claim that modern Euro-American psychologists were colluding by design with the colonial powers to create a specific type of Orientalist image that would fulfill the agenda of the European colonialists. Rather, many of the psychologists I discuss strongly
believed that their “psychological” assumptions about the “Other” were derived from objective scientific and logical reasoning.

I begin by specifically examining how science and technology as ideological tools were used by the British empire to control the colonial natives in India. Second, I examine how several forerunners of modern psychology played an important role in indirectly providing philosophical and “scientific” evidence to the European colonial empires to justify their Orientalist program in non-Western countries. Third, I use Indian psychology as an example to illustrate how traces of Orientalist ideologies continue to inform much of contemporary Indian psychology. I conclude by discussing the implications of the continuing presence and dominance of Euro-American psychology for both Euro-American and non-Western psychology.

Science, Technology, and the “Civilizing Mission”

Science and technology provided the British imperial government with the precise instruments that were needed to assess and rank the psychological makeup of colonized natives. Such rankings of the psychological abilities of the uncivilized non-Westerners contributed, explicitly or implicitly, to the creation of the Orient and provided justification for the continuation of British imperialism. Adas (1989) mapped out in comprehensive detail how 18th- and 19th-century European imperial empires used the power of technology and science to justify the “civilizing mission” in non-Western colonies. He argued that one way the intellectuals and the government officials in charge of the colonies set Europe apart from the non-Western cultures was by attributing traits of rationality, modernity, and science to the Western culture. Science, according to Adas (1989), became the sole criterion for determining measurements of “cranial capacity, estimate of railway mileage, and the capacity for work, discipline, and marking time[, and these] became the decisive criteria by which Europeans judged other cultures and celebrated the superiority of their own” (p. 146).

In a similar vein, scholars such as Alvares (1980), Nandy (1989), and Prakash (1999) have articulated how the British empire used the ideology of science and technology to fulfill its mission to “tame” and civilize Indian subjects. Prakash pointed out that the development of Western scientific disciplines, such as ethnology, political economy, botany, medicine, geology, and meteorology, occurred simultaneously with the rise of modern imperialism. Similarly, Said (1993) demonstrated how, with the rise of colonialism, the “structures of location and geographical references” (p. 52) within Western literature, history, and philosophy underwent remarkable changes.

It is widely known that by the late 19th century the classification of non-Western races as the “Other,” to be exhibited, studied, and photographed, was done not only in the interest of science but also to justify the tenets of the civilizing mission. Adas (1989) pointed out that a “tautological relationship” developed between the concept of race and scientific achievements. On the one hand, scientific achievements were used as the most meaningful criterion of determining racial capacity, and on the other hand, “estimates of racial capacity” were used to formulate policies that would decide how much science, technical,
and English-language education should be given to various non-Western colonial subjects (Adas, 1989, p. 275).

Most 19th-century scholarship dealing with “racial categories” does not specifically use the term race or provide biological-level explanations to rank cultures and various groups of people. Until about the last decade of the 19th century, many European intellectuals and administrators believed that Europeans were superior to Asians and Africans, especially in terms of scientific and technological accomplishments. However, such judgments and claims of European superiority were based on cultural attainments rather than innate biological differences. For example, James Mill (1848), in an influential book on the history of British India, throughout referred to Indians as “rude,” “lazy,” “timid,” “ignorant,” and “prone to flattery.” In the Preface, he admitted that he had never visited India and possessed only a slight familiarity with the native Indian languages. Nevertheless, he went on to suggest that many “European witnesses have been struck with the indelicacy of the Hindus. The gross emblems and practices of their religion are already known” (Mill, 1848, p. 463).

Such historical claims about Indians in the early part of the mid-19th century were quite rampant in the books written by the British intellectuals, but these claims to Hindu inferiority and British superiority, as reflected in Mill’s (1848) work, were largely based on cultural and religious comparisons rather than on racial or physiological differences. For example, with regard to India, Adas (1989) noted that “race” did not play an important role in the debates over English education and other educational policies in the early part of the 19th century.

The argument about how to proceed with instituting English language in the colonies took place between colonialists, whom Adas (1989) described as either belonging to the camp of the “improvers” or the “Orientalists.” Both groups firmly believed in using the English language to carry out the civilizing mission, but they differed in regard to the method through which such a goal would be accomplished. Adas (1989) explained that the Orientalists favored grafting Western learning, which they conceded was undoubtedly superior in many areas, onto the trunk of Indian knowledge. The improvers wanted to plant a new tree imported from the West and let the banyan of ancient Indian wisdom wither as the new growth flourished. (p. 280)

For example, Charles Grant, the Chairman of the Court of Director of the East India Company in the early 1800s, pushed for educational reform that was in accordance with Orientalist beliefs. He believed, as Adas (1989) suggested, in the “racial origins of British moral superiority, but his estimate for the potential for Indian improvement was decidedly non-racist” (p. 276). It was the publication of Darwin’s The Origin of Species (1859/1958), with its emphasis on evolutionary theory, that set the stage for the development of what has been described as “scientific racism” (Richards, 1997, p. 13).

Psychology and the Racial Construction of the “Other”

Darwin (1859/1958) had a major influence on Western sciences in general and on psychology in particular (Charlesworth, 1986; Gould, 1981). His emphasis on
individual differences in the evolutionary process, coupled with his recognition of continuity in the mental life between animals and humans, ushered in an era of scientific work on comparative mental and anatomical development, such as phrenology, polygeny, and craniometry (Gould, 1981; Jahoda, 1992, 1999).

Before scientific scholarship on comparative psychologies began, two general cultural assumptions about racial rankings were prevalent in European America. One assumption was that the African race was “inferior and their biological status justified enslavement and colonization” (Gould, 1981, p. 31). The other shared cultural view of that time also affirmed that Africans and non-Westerners were inferior, but it also emphasized that their “rights to freedom did not depend upon their level of intelligence” (Gould, 1981, p. 31). Even “American cultural heroes” such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson had fully embraced the notion of Caucasian racial and cultural superiority. For example, Gould (1981) wrote that Jefferson believed that the inferiority of Africans was “cultural” and that he wished for a time when the American society would become a “domain of whites, undiluted by less pleasing colors” (p. 32).

In an attempt to establish connections between race and evolutionary theory, Darwin (1871/1888) asked “Do the races or species of men, whichever term may be applied, encroach on and replace one another, so that some finally become extinct?” (p. 7). A large part of Darwin’s (1871/1888) book *The Descent of Man* focuses on this question, and at one point he addresses the question by suggesting that with “savages, the weak in body or mind are soon eliminated; and those that survive commonly exhibit a vigorous state of health. . . . We must therefore bear the undoubtedly bad effects of the weak surviving and propagating their kind” (pp. 205–206).

Darwin’s work on evolution allowed many European intellectuals to establish a scientific link among culture, race, and psychology. For example, Gould (1981) pointed out that Darwin, the “liberal and passionate abolitionist,” spoke anxiously about a time in the future when the “gap” between Caucasians and the lower animals would increase as a result of the extinction of “intermediates” such as “negroes,” aboriginals, and the chimpanzees (p. 36).

Darwin’s publication on evolutionary theory is, however, not the only historical factor that led to an increase in scholarship on scientific racism. The birth of scientific racism, according to Richards (1997), also occurred simultaneously with, and arose from, mid-19th century sociocultural and economic phenomena, such as the emergence of a strong class-based society, the gradual loss of interest in the philosophy of radical egalitarianism in Europe, the growing cultural authority of science over religion, and the social movement to abolish slavery in the United States. Psychology’s indirect role in providing justification for fulfilling the imperialist agenda begins with the rise of scientific racism. Richards noted that Darwin’s evolutionary theory, which was published in the late 19th century, provides the “overarching” conceptual framework for all psychological inquiry. He explained:

Scientific Racism set the terms in which Psychology began addressing [the] race-differences issue. . . . Along with child development, animal behavior, psycho-physiology, social deviancy and crowd behavior, race differences fitted into
the wider project of studying “man’s place in nature” from an evolutionary perspective. . . . the blasé use of terms such as “savage,” “inferior,” “lower,” [and] “primitive” would continue for several decades. (Richards, 1997, p. 59)

Most scholarship on scientific racism, however, in the latter part of the 19th century was primarily developed by physicians, physical anthropologists, philologists, and social theorists. Modern psychology was still trying to establish its identity as a discipline separate from others. The idea that various human races could be ranked, with Europeans at the top of the tree diagram and the African slaves at the bottom, became quite commonplace in the late 19th century.

In addition to slavery, the concept of racial rankings was used by political leaders in Europe and the United States to justify the colonization of non-Westerners. The intellectual and political leaders in the United States and Europe were quick to suggest that “national variations among human beings were the result of racial constitution” and that the non-European colonized people were at a “lower level of the great chain of being” (Cole, 1996, p. 11). For example, acknowledging the racial and cultural inferiority of Indians, Macaulay (1972) proposed that “we [the British] must at present do our best to form . . . a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect” (p. 249).

The beginnings of psychology are linked to a time when many European and American intellectuals had conceptualized the non-Western “Other” as an inferior and “primitive” savage. Such Orientalist depictions are consistently found in the work of important pioneers of psychology, such as Darwin (1859/1958), Galton (1909), and Spencer (1851/1969). This is not to say that these intellectuals were politically motivated and consciously using philosophy and psychology to confirm their Orientalist social beliefs; rather, these theorists firmly believed that their writings were furnishing an objective set of philosophical and scientific arguments that were independent of the social and political values of that time. Thus, Darwin’s ideas of evolution set the stage for establishing links between culture and mental progress and provided a new psychological framework for reconfiguring the developmental capacities of the “primitives.”

Culture and the Development of “Primitive” Mentality

One way in which Orientalist representations of “primitive” mentality were made more credible, concrete, and causal in the social sciences is by introducing what Cole (1996) described as the theory of sociocultural evolutionism, which basically emphasized differences in groups as a result of the relationship between sociocultural development and mental development (Cole, 1996; Hallpike, 1979; Jahoda, 1992). Galton’s (1883) book *Hereditary Genius* is one of the first systematic attempts at linking psychology, culture, and race in an elaborate manner.

In one of his book chapters, titled “The Comparative Worth of Different Races,” Galton (1883) formulated a 15-point scale that ostensibly allowed him to measure the “inherited” abilities of the different races. By combining the measurements of his interval scale with his travel experiences in the United States, he noted that
the number among the negroes of those whom we should call half-witted men, is very large. . . . The mistakes the negroes made in their own matters, were so childish, stupid, and simpleton-like, as frequently to make me ashamed of my own species. (Galton, 1883, p. 339)

He then went on to evaluate the “negroes” as being two grades below the European races and the Australian aboriginals as “one grade below the African negro” (Galton, 1883, p. 339). The basic goal of carrying out these race-based evaluations was “obviously, if not quite explicitly, to canvass the possibility of evaluating the relative suitabilities of the peoples of the European empires for civilization” (Richards, 1997, pp. 18–19).

Similarly, Spencer (1851/1969), one of the best known proponents of cultural evolutionism, argued that it was rightful and fair for the lesser adapted groups (“savages”) with simple cultures to give up their rights and freedom to the superior European groups. Thus, he wrote that just “as the savage has taken the place of lower creatures, so must he, if he have remained too long a savage, give place to his superior” (Spencer, 1851/1969, p. 416). Spencer’s (1876/1977) book *The Comparative Psychology of Man* most explicitly accounts for psychological differences in terms of race, biology, and evolution. At one point, he wrote, “the dominant races overrun the inferior races mainly in virtue of the greater quantity of energy in which this greater mental mass shows itself” (Spencer, 1876/1977, p. 8). Thereafter, he observed that “biological law” gives evidence that the “higher the organisms the longer they take to evolve,” and thus as a consequence the “members of the inferior human races may be expected to complete their evolution sooner than members of the superior races” (p. 9). The link between sociocultural environments and mental traits led to the assumption that if primitive adults belonging to inferior races lived in less complex sociocultural environments, then their “mentality” was similar to the children of modern European industrial societies (Hallowell, 1955).

During the late 19th century, it became very common for European intellectuals to compare non-Western “primitive” adults to European children on characteristics such as “inability to control the emotions, animistic thinking, inability to reason out cause or plan for [the] future, conservatism, love of analogy, symbolism, and so on” (Cole, 1996, p. 16). However, Spencer (1851/1969) was not the only scholar who compared the primitive thinking of adults to that of European children. He was, along with many others, simply reflecting the popular social beliefs of the time and was unwittingly reinforcing those same Orientalist beliefs and ideas through his philosophical and scientific writings.

*The “Child” Psychology of the Primitive Adult*

Spencer’s (1851/1969) writings give one a taste not only of how non-Westerners were described by European intellectuals but also, and more important, how such cross-cultural descriptions provided the groundwork for the thesis of primitives as children. Gould (1981, p. 113) argued that the *biogenetic doctrine*, which is also widely known as a phenomenon in which “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” was used as “scientific” proof for the idea that the
cognitive capacities of adult primitives were similar to those of European children.

The recapitulation hypothesis emphasizes that individual development in ontogenesis recapitulates or unfolds the whole “history of the species” (Cole, 1996, p. 17). The primitive-as-child thesis gained widespread recognition because it was assumed that “if adult blacks and women were like white male children, then they are living representatives of an ancestral stage in the evolution of white males” (Gould, 1981, p. 115). The biogenetic doctrine was promptly used to justify colonialism, and the idea provided a measurable standard for scientists who were interested in ranking human groups according to their biological and psychological makeup.

The recapitulation thesis, which is based on biology, was subsequently used to understand the psychological development of both the Euro-Americans and the “primitives.” The recapitulation thesis was one of the most influential ideas of 19th-century science, and both psychoanalytic and developmental psychologists had seriously integrated such a thesis into their research (Hallowell, 1955). For instance, G. Stanley Hall, one of the founders of the American Psychological Association, was also one of the first American psychologists to explore the developmental dimensions of the recapitulation thesis in his work on adolescence.

“Ethnic Psychology” and the “Adolescent Races”

Hall (1904) wrote a chapter in his famous book on adolescence that was titled “Ethnic Psychology and Pedagogy, or Adolescent Races and Their Treatment.” He begins the chapter by suggesting that the study of adolescence must be understood against the backdrop of colonialism, in which one third of the human race occupies two-fifths of the globe and controls 136 colonies. The process of colonization, Hall (1904, p. 649) explained, had been swift and rapid since the “great competitive scramble” for land began in 1897. One paragraph later, he wrote that “most savages in most respects are children, or, because of sexual maturity, more properly, adolescents of adult size” (p. 649). He then goes on to suggest that history has recorded that

Each of the great races has developed upon a basis of a lower one, and our progress has been so amazing that in it we read our title clear to dominion. If they linger, they must take up our burden of culture and work. This sentiment has found several remarkable expressions in Europe within the last few years, both by soldiers and thinkers [italics added]. (Hall, 1904, p. 652)

All the major Orientalist ideas—the biogenetic doctrines, sociocultural evolutionism, and colonialism—are directly or indirectly present in Hall’s writings. What is significant is Hall’s emphasis that both “soldiers and thinkers” in Europe were preoccupied by the idea of exterminating other races and expanding the dominion of the West. Also, it is of no surprise to many readers that the political powers of imperialism had recruited armies of soldiers to “domesticate” or wipe out the resistant indigenous populations in Asia and Africa.

In sum, Orientalist ideas about non-Westerners have consistently echoed in the writings of the pioneers of developmental psychology such as Darwin, Galton,
Hall, and Spencer. Recall Said’s (1979) four dogmas of the Orientalist project: One can find them present, in one version or another, in the writings of the founders and pioneers of Euro-American psychology. However, as mentioned before, this does not imply that these developmental psychologists deliberately and consciously carved out their theories to provide “scientific” justification for the imperial vision of the European colonists. Furthermore, there were many intellectual and political leaders in the native colonies who were disillusioned by the ideas contained within their indigenous philosophies and cultural traditions. For example, the philosophical theories of rationalism, logic, and positivism put forward by Western theorists not only provided some Indian intellectuals with a framework to re-examine the limits of their orthodox traditions but also allowed them to establish an equivalence between Western science and indigenous knowledge.

Science, Psychoanalysis, and Resistance to Orientalism

In the mid-19th century, some elite Indian intellectuals, disenchanted with the philosophy, traditions, and cultural practices that Hinduism had to offer, began to look toward Western science for new ways of thinking and restructuring Indian society (Prakash, 1999). The elite upper class, Western-educated bhadralok (upper class Bengali elite) found popular ways to realign and reinvent Hinduism by using the logic and rationality of science. The Brahmao Samaj was one of the first organizations that formulated the systematic rethinking of Hindu religion by adhering to the principles of Western science. Calcutta became the seat of cultural innovation in colonial India and set the ground for what became known as the “Bengal Renaissance.” The leaders of this renaissance movement, such as Bankim Chandra Chattopadhaya, Akshay Kumar Dutt, and Ishwarchandra Vidyasagar, deployed the vocabulary of rationality for discussions on widow remarriage, women’s education, and the importance of vernacular literature.

The strategic repositioning of Western science with Hindu religion was meant to show that the universalism of Western science was always present in Hinduism, and thus the two bodies of knowledge were on par with and equal to each other. By equating the two diverse bodies of knowledge, the intellectuals in India found a way to assert their agency and began to contest, at least indirectly, Orientalist ideas about the natives as being primitives and needing freedom from ignorance and superstition. Prakash (1999) observed that

Late-nineteenth-century gatherings of Europeans and the bhadralok intellectuals in Calcutta may have been heavy with the air of gratitude and loyalty to British rule, but smoldering underneath it was the explosive cross-hatching of mind with matter, Vedanta with positivism. For, to locate the origin of reason centuries before the Enlightenment in Vedantic monism was to question Western claims. (p. 84)

The importation of psychoanalysis as a science in colonial India provides an interesting account of how a handful of Indian intellectuals in early 20th-century Bengal used psychoanalysis to both critique the orthodox culture of Hindu society and subtly contest the Orientalist theories and representations of the Indian natives.
Hartnack (1987) gave an account of how two British officers—Owen Berkeley-Hill and Claud Dangar Daly—used psychoanalytic theory in the 1920s to educate the “colonial administration in dealing with Indians who dared to question British rule” (p. 233). For example, Berkeley-Hill (1921) wrote that the “Hindu has all the disadvantageous traits of an anal-erotic personality, such as irritability, bad-temper, unhappiness, hypochondria, miserliness, meanness, pettiness, slow-mindedness, a tendency to bore, a bent for tyrannizing and dictating, and obstinacy” (p. 335). In contrast to the negative traits of the Hindus, he drew an opposite portrait of Europeans and suggested that the English exhibit traits of “individualism, determination, persistence, love of power and organization...and the capacity for unusual tenderness” (Berkeley-Hill, 1921, p. 335). Similarly, Claud Dangar Daly (1930) proposed to the British government that British parents could be the bridge through which their helpless children, such as the Indian natives, could be slowly guided into adult life and that in due time they would be allowed to live an “independent but responsible existence” (p. 199).

Nandy (1995) asserted that both Berkeley-Hill and Daly were like many other British social scientists who firmly believed that psychoanalysis as a therapeutic technique mixed with a twist of Indianness would “serve as a partial cure for the worst afflictions Indians suffered from—Indianness” (p. 101). He wrote that the Indian psychoanalysts were mainly indifferent to the colonial psychology of Berkeley-Hill and Daly, because for many Indian psychoanalysts of that generation “such politically-loaded cultural interpretations were not uncommon and they blended with the dominant tone of the humanities and social sciences at Indian universities” (Nandy, 1995, p. 101). Despite the indifference shown toward psychoanalysis by most Indian intellectuals, some urban Indian intellectuals (e.g., the Bhadralok) believed that psychoanalysis as an instrument of social criticism could be used to both deconstruct the anachronistic Hindu traditions and contest the Orientalist depictions of Indians.

Girindrasekhar Bose, one of the pioneering leaders of the psychoanalytic movement in colonial India, was one of the first social scientists to attempt to “Indianize” Western psychoanalysis to fit the Indian psyche. In his attempt at molding psychoanalysis to fit the particulars of Hindu culture, Bose had to formulate psychoanalytic ideas that differed from Freud’s emphasis on the universal aspects of the theory. Thus, Bose (1929/1999) stated that

I do not agree with Freud when he says that the Oedipus wishes ultimately succumb to the authority of the superego...I have already mentioned that in the case of Indian patients the castration complex is never prominent, although castration threat is almost a daily admonition in Indian homes. (p. 35)

After analyzing several pieces of correspondence between Bose and Freud, Hartnack (1999) concluded that Freud was ambivalent toward Bose’s work and considered his intercultural exchanges as deviating from the psychoanalytic canon. Freud agreed with Bose on those ideas that confirmed his theory but refrained from acknowledging or recognizing the specific cultural interpretation of psychoanalysis that seemed relevant within the Indian context.

The upper class elite members of Bengal, such as Bose, were obviously not the sole intellectuals in the colonized societies to contest Orientalist representa-
tions of the natives. If there were psychologists, such as Berkeley-Hill and Daly, who had both forcefully adopted and reinforced the Orientalist ideas, then there were other Euro-American psychologists and scholars who were equally skeptical about the Orientalist project and resisted portraying more than half the people in the world as savages (Boas, 1911; James, 1890). One notices especially in the 1920s and 1930s a shift in how some psychologists began to view the natives. As the force of evolutionary thinking began to loosen its grip on psychology, many anthropologists and psychologists began to re-examine the notion of the primitive mind as childlike. For example, the recapitulation thesis was seriously contested by, among others, the French anthropologist Lévy Bruhl.

Bruhl (1921/1923, 1925/1928), in his book *Primitive Mentality*, provided one of the first thorough critiques of the racist images of non-Westerners as primitives and savages. He disputed the claim that savages are innately inferior to Europeans in terms of cognitive capacities. Instead, he argued that the savage mind is driven by participation in “mystic” forces and “prelogical” thinking (Bruhl, 1921/1923, p. 59). Drawing on examples from folklore, witchcraft, and sorcery of primitive cultures, Bruhl (1921/1923) suggested that for primitive men the world of the seen and the unseen, visible and invisible, spirit and body, are one and the same. The primitive man lives in a world where secondary causes are ignored and the soul and the spirit are seen as having power and agency to make things happen. For the primitive man, in contrast to the “logical world” of the Europeans, the dreams, omens, sacrifices, incantations, ritual ceremonies, and magic manifest various forms of the divine and the mystical. The primitive man may use logical thinking in building spears and pots, but those are reserved for the practical aspects of life. In most other aspects of life, however, the primitive man lives in a world that is fundamentally governed by a different type of cognitive orientation that cannot be compared with the European man’s world.

Although Bruhl’s work rejected the idea that primitives are inferior to Europeans, Richards (1997) noted that he “dramatically exaggerates the gulf between his primitive and civilized ‘mentalities,’ while terms like ‘lower,’ ‘inferior’ and ‘undeveloped’ pepper his texts, suggesting implicit acceptance of some kind of social-evolutionary orientation” (p. 161). Bruhl ignored those instances where there was evidence of overlapping mentalities between the Europeans and the primitive people. Bartlett (1923), in *Psychology and Primitive Culture*, for example, argued that Bruhl’s reflections did not compare the primitive man’s thinking and the “ordinary member of a modern social group” but were more of a comparison between a primitive man’s thinking and the “scientific expert” in his field (p. 284). The issue that Bruhl overlooked is that it “is not that the primitive or the abnormal are wrongly observed, but that the modern and normal are hardly observed at all” (Bartlett, 1923, p. 284).

In the following decade, around the beginning of World War II, there were new movements in psychology and related fields in Britain and the United States that examined the psychology of race at the intersection of personality, culture, and biology. Scholars such as Benedict (1940) and Klineberg (1935, 1944), within the context of the “Negro problem” in the United States, began looking at the interface between race and psychology as embedded within history, social conditions, and the politics of racism and prejudice. Similarly, after World War II
(WWII), cross-cultural psychologists in Europe and the United States became engaged in re-examining the degrading language that was used in describing the psychology of non-Western people (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992). The absolute crudity and inhumaneness of the Orientalist thought found in 19th-century Euro-American psychology may have evaporated, but ethnocentric thinking continued to define the parameters of cross-cultural investigations that were undertaken in non-Western cultures in early postcolonial contexts.

Cross-Cultural Psychology and the “Other” in Early and Late Postcolonial Contexts

A review of cross-cultural studies conducted in post-WWII and postcolonial contexts suggests that Euro-American psychologists had moved from describing the non-Western “Others” as brute savages or exotic people to individuals living in preliterate, premodern, and traditional societies. Such a change in describing the “Other,” however, did not mean that the ethnocentric bias of 19th-century thinking had vanished. The results of cross-cultural empirical studies continued to show European superiority and Oriental inferiority on measurements of cognitive development (Jahoda, 1992). Cross-cultural studies saw a significant shift in their representations of other non-Western populations in the 1960s and 1970s. There was a marked shift not so much in redefining non-Westerners on their own terms but more so in studying the development of non-Westerners in light of the emerging postcolonial, Third World economic contexts.

The representation of the Third World societies in much of the cultural–developmental research in psychology was set against and conducted in the context of the reconfiguration that was taking place among the “First World” powers after WWII (Cole, 1996). In the 1960s, cross-cultural psychology “took off,” and psychologists became interested in studying the effects of modern education and literacy on the cognitive development of Third World children and adults (Berry et al., 1992; Cole, 1996; Jahoda, 1992). Cross-cultural psychologists, mostly using a Piagetian framework, began measuring non-Western children’s levels of cognitive development with respect to numbers, shapes, pictures, and puzzles, and the results of these studies continued to show a “deficit model of cultural variation” (Cole, 1996, p. 71).

Echoing 19th-century ideas of sociocultural evolutionism, many studies on perception, intelligence, and memory led to the same, age-old Orientalist stereotype that there was a developmental lag between traditional and modern European children. Such research suggested that African children could not do problem-solving tasks; did not know how to classify; had perceptual incapacities; and were deficient in logical, mathematical, and formal reasoning. Cole (1996, p. 73), who was a witness to such Orientalist representations during his work as a psychologist in Africa, wrote that he “found these generalizations difficult to credit. It’s a long way from inability to do jigsaw puzzles to general perceptual incapacities.”

What Cole and his colleagues were emphasizing, then, is that African children did not developmentally lag behind European children because of cultural and cognitive deficits; rather, there was a developmental lag or an inconsistency between the “psychological reality” that was constructed through the research
methods and practices of Euro-American psychology and the psychological
reality of the African individuals living in their local cultures (Cole, Gay, Glick,
& Sharp, 1971).

Richards (1997), in his analysis of cross-cultural research conducted in
Europe and North America after WWII, pointed out that although cross-cultural
psychologists were “non-racialist,” the stance adopted by many cross-cultural
researchers “remained[,] often unwittingly, Euro-centric” (p. 226). Furthermore,
he observed that the Eurocentric view continued to dominate the cross-cultural
psychology of the 1960s and 1970s through two major factors.

First, research interests had been determined by Western psychological concerns.
This means that whereas in Europe and North America Psychological research
emerges from the psychological preoccupations of the society at large, Psycho-
logical research undertaken in other cultures by Europeans and North Americans
does not. . . . Secondly, the habit of taking white performance as the norm could
prove difficult to shake off. (Richards, 1997, p. 226)

The search for universals in cross-cultural psychology continued in the 1970s
and remains a major objective of cross-cultural psychologists today (see Segall,
Lonner, & Berry, 1998). By the mid-1970s, cross-cultural psychology had be-
come a “thrusting intellectual enterprise,” with the creation of many membership
organizations and new journals for publishing research related to cross-cultural
scholarship (Berry et al., 1992; Triandis, 1980). An examination of the research
published in those journals and books in the last 30 years indicates that cross-
cultural psychology has evolved by firmly adhering to the principles and objec-
tives of mainstream American psychology (Triandis, 1980). Prominent cross-
cultural psychologists such as Segall et al. (1998) have recently repeated their
commitment to those objectives by suggesting that cross-cultural psychologists
examine “cultural variables very carefully [a process they call “peeling the
onion”] in order to reveal the ‘psychic’ unity of mankind at the core of culture”
(p. 1104).

Berry et al. (1992) laid out three specific goals for cross-cultural psychology.
The first goal essentially aims at transporting hypotheses and findings generated
in Western universities to new cultural settings and contexts to test their appli-
cability to other groups of people (Berry et al., 1992, p. 3). The second goal of
cross-cultural psychology is to “explore other cultures in order to discover
psychological variations that are not present in one’s own limited cultural expe-
riences” (Berry et al., 1992, p. 3). The third goal is an attempt to “assemble and
integrate” the results of the first two goals into a broad-based psychology that will
closely resemble a “more nearly universal psychology . . . that will be valid for a
broad range of cultures” (Berry et al., 1992, p. 3).

It is important to be explicit about these objectives, because cross-cultural
psychologists believe that there are universal laws that govern the psychological
processes of all human beings, and they further acknowledge that this brand of
Euro-American–universal “psychology can be exported and imported ‘as is’
(from Western culture to developing countries)” (Berry et al., 1992, p. 378).
Although cross-cultural psychologists believe that their “universal psychology”
need not be “Western” in its makeup, they acknowledge that “others, both
psychologists and populations at large, have come to understand themselves in terms derived from Western psychological science” (Berry et al., 1992, p. 379). The idea that Euro-American psychological science is being exported by First World psychologists for the consumption of indigenous populations in Third World societies points to a different kind of Orientalism that Said (1993) described as cultural imperialism. He explained:

The term “imperialism” means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory. . . . In our time, direct colonialism has largely ended; imperialism, as we shall see, lingers where it has always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic and social practices. (Said, 1993, p. 9)

Euro-American psychology lingers on in the cultural sphere of non-Western, postcolonial contexts in varied forms. Although Euro-American psychology has come a long way from describing the non-Western “Other” in 19th-century Orientalist terms, the core theoretical and conceptual frameworks that are used to represent and study the non-Western “Other” continue to emerge from the bastions of Euro-American psychology. Gergen, Gulerce, Lock, and Misra (1996, pp. 500–501) reminded readers that cross-cultural psychologists were able to recognize the “cultural shortsightedness of western psychology,” but overall “they have been unable to abandon mainstream scientism in general and remain loyal to empiricism and test western theories with ‘culturally’ (i.e., geographically) diverse data.”

The exporting of Euro-American universal psychology “as is,” for the consumption of Third World psychologists, has led to a virtual abandonment of indigenous representations of psychology in Third World psychology departments. In the following section I use the case of Indian psychology to demonstrate how the presence and acceptance of some “foreign psychology” highlights the movement away from a physical colonization to an intellectual colonization of the mind, a process that had led the Indian psychologist to what Nandy (1974) described as the “lowest depth” in his or her “dungeon” (p. 5).

The Example of Indian Psychology: The View From the “Other” Side

The postcolonial condition in India and other colonies is made up of what Nandy (1989) described as “second colonization” (p. xi). This kind of colonialism, he argued, colonizes the mind as well as the body and “helps generalize the concept of modern West from a geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category. The West is now everywhere, within the West and outside; in structures and minds” (Nandy, 1989, p. xii). Nandy (1989) further foregrounded the point that this second form of colonization is as dangerous as the first kind, because it is “almost always unconscious and almost always ignored . . . it creates a culture in which the ruled are constantly tempted to fight their rulers within the psychological limits set by the latter” (p. 3). Nandy’s (1989) remark captures the state of Indian psychology in the postcolonial context: Indian psychology in the postcolonial period continues to operate within the boundaries and limits that were set forth by Euro-American psychology. A few Indian psychologists have
documented the colonial legacy of Indian psychology (Naidu, 1994; Pandey, 1988; D. Sinha, 1984, 1986; J. B. P. Sinha, 1984). The early colonial Indian psychologists who were trained in Euro-American psychology were highly successful in setting up a legacy of Euro-American psychology in Indian universities and academic departments. This legacy was further cemented when Euro-American psychology as a package was “exported” to India as part of the “transfer of knowledge” from the developed, First World countries to the underdeveloped, Third World countries (Gergen et al., 1996; D. Sinha, 1986). The package brought, along with itself, a “foreign” psychology with its own concepts, theoretical frameworks, methodologies, and disciplinary values that had been created within the Euro-American sociocultural context.

The story of Indian psychology parallels the rise of British and North American psychology. The blind copying and imitation of Western psychology by Indian psychologists was, in Nandy’s (1974) view, a response to the “feeling of inferiority” that they had experienced during colonial times (p. 7). Their uncritical acceptance of Western psychology was also an expression of subservience to their colonial masters. Nandy (1974) noted that “all budding psychologists in India were expected to show due respect to the Anglo-Saxon stalwarts, and Western degrees and training were at a high premium” (p. 1). By the 1970s, Indian psychologists were primarily using Euro-American textbooks in their undergraduate and graduate curricula and were importing Euro-American standardized intelligence and personality tests to assess the various “abilities” of the Indian population.

It is important to mention here that neither Nandy nor any other Indian psychologist mentioned above was suggesting that Euro-American psychology is irrelevant in the Indian context. Rather, they were foregrounding the point that the history of modern Indian psychology is closely intertwined with India’s larger colonial and postcolonial history. Such a history is disturbing, because the native psychologists were, consciously or unconsciously, carrying forth the Orientalist ideals of the West. Gergen et al. (1996) noted that the presence of Euro-American psychology within Indian universities was so strong and influential that many Indian psychologists maintained a “distance” and often looked down on their own psychological traditions with absolute “suspicion” (p. 497). Nandy (1974), witnessing the deplorable conditions of Indian psychology about 30 years ago, wrote that cross-cultural work being conducted in North America was detrimental to the growth of indigenous psychology in India. He asserted that “The crumbs which fall from the tables of Western psychologists interested in cross-cultural research reinforce this tendency. As a result Indian psychology has become not merely imitative and subservient but also dull and replicative” (Nandy, 1974, p. 5).

The Orientalist perception that the non-Western “Other” is incapable of defining his or her self and needs help from the West was clearly reflected in Indian psychology’s dependence on Euro-American psychology. Furthermore, the “mentality” and psychology that the Euro-American intellectuals had created for the non-Westerners in order to control, colonize, and denigrate them was, in part, being held up as a mirror by the Indian psychologists to understand the development of their own sense of self.

Many Indian psychologists, in the initial years of postcolonial India, adopted
Western psychology because they found their stock of indigenous psychological traditions to be guided by mythical, blind, and irrational assumptions about the formation of the psyche and soul. The first generation of Indian psychologists, working within a colonial context, were in many ways similar to the Bhadralok intellectuals of mid to late 19th-century Bengal. The early Indian psychologists were disillusioned by their indigenous traditional psychological therapies such as meditation, yoga, and tantric healing practices and questioned the scientific validity of these various ancient practices. The first prime minister of independent India was Jawaharlal Nehru, and his vision of India as a secular, modern nation free from poverty and disease was anchored in the promise of science and technology. Like their counterparts in science, medicine, and economics, the first generation of foreign-trained Indian psychologists genuinely believed that Euro-American psychology, as an empirical science, with its claims to cultural neutrality, had the power to provide insight into the religious and superstitious worlds of the Indian population.

If the dependence of Indian psychology on Euro-American psychology was a part of a narrative of the past, then Indian psychologists in the present would have much about which to rejoice. However, Nandy’s (1974) comment that “If it rains in the metropolitan centers of psychology, we of course have to open our umbrellas” still holds true for Indian psychology (p. 2). Under these circumstances, Nandy (1974) made a plea to Indian psychologists to “rediscover” themselves as professional psychologists. He acknowledged that he felt “strange” asking Indian psychologists to be reflective, because self-discovery has been the “quintessence of all knowledge” in much of ancient Indian psychological traditions (Nandy, 1974, p. 12). Nandy was not asking Indian psychologists to abandon the psychological frameworks that are derived from Euro-American societies; instead, he was appealing to Indian psychologists to re-examine how compatible Western psychological frameworks are with a society that is traditional, multireligious, multilingual, secular, and modern.

Questions regarding the artificial juxtaposition of modernity on religion have preoccupied Indian intellectuals and political leaders since India gained independence from Britain. Such questions have become all the more important in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States; the rise of global terrorism; globalization; the spread of religious fundamentalism; and the apparent polarization of the world between traditional Islamic societies and modern, Western secular democracies. Within the context of the new climate of global terrorism, intellectuals and scholars from both the Muslim world and North America have raised questions about the compatibility among Islamic principles, traditions, cultural practices, and secular democracy—that is, is Western modernity inherently at odds with the Islamic worldview? What is the conception of human rights within an indigenous Islamic tradition? Can a monarchy based on Islamic tenets adopt a secular, democratic framework? How is personhood constructed within Islamic culture and psychology?

Within the context of India, especially with regard to the rise of Hindu nationalism since the early 1990s, there have been ongoing debates about how compatible Western notions of liberal humanism and secular ideologies of human rights are with the multiple duty-based traditions of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism,
and Jainism. In the last 50 years, India and other regions of south Asia have witnessed constant communal violence based on religious fundamentalism and ethnic differences, and several millions of people have died in the fires of communal riots. On the one hand, there are Indian intellectuals who believe that science, technology, and the principles of Western secularism and modernity will provide some answers to mass poverty, unemployment, and the rise of religious fundamentalism and ethnic violence in India. On the other hand, other Indian intellectuals believe that the project of modernity, with its emphasis on rights, has failed miserably in a country that primarily organizes its social and cultural life around its religious traditions.

These intellectuals point to many reasons for such a failure, and I do not have the space to articulate all of them here (see Vanaik, 1997). However, for the present purposes it might be useful to mention a few reasons that explain the failure of modernity in India. Some Indian intellectuals believe that “secularism is in origin a profoundly Western, at least un-Indian, concept, and it is at odds with the reality of non-Western/non-Christian existence in general” (Vanaik, 1997, p. 29). In other words, the concept of Western secularism was artificially imposed on India by means of colonialism. As a result, unlike the Western notions of a civil society, the Indian secular state maintains its impartiality “not by abstinence from religious affairs but by its ‘fair’ involvement on India’s multi-religious terrain” (Vanaik, 1997, p. 67). However, Indian political history and practice remind us that the state has, to quote Vanaik (1997) again, too often indulged in an “active balancing of favors to various religious communities” (p. 67). Such a partial and biased involvement toward a single religious group or many religious groups is quite contrary to the fundamental principles of “impartiality” implemented in the Western secular state. Unable to reconcile the two rather incompatible systems—the system of religion and modernity on the one hand and the accompanying notions of duties and secular rights on the other hand—the Indian political culture has become extremely weak and fragmented. In the wake of such political chaos, many intellectuals argue that India must simply move away from Western, enlightenment notions of rights-based discourse to a more indigenous notion of rights within their multiple faiths and religious traditions (Vanaik, 1997).

The state of Indian psychology mirrors to a certain extent the dilemmas of the larger Indian sociopolitical context, and Nandy’s (1974) concerns about the state of Indian psychology, raised many decades ago, continue to be relevant. Of course, Nandy has not been the lone voice in making a radical plea for Indian psychology to change: Prominent Indian psychologists have made such pleas repeatedly and have also taken constructive steps toward “indigenizing” modern psychology to make it more relevant to their local and cultural practices (for a review, see D. Sinha, 1986). However, the move toward indigenization of psychology in India and other places in the Third World refers to what some Indian psychologists have described as cosmetic, superficial, and outward. The bulk of indigenization, for example, within Indian psychology has been mainly carried out within the overall core structure and principles of Euro-American psychology (Naidu, 1994; Varma, 1995). Naidu (1994) noted that “one may indigenize some peripheral aspect of research by, say, giving local color to the items of an imported questionnaire or insisting that the use of a native sample alone renders
the study indigenous!” (p. 78). What Naidu was highlighting in the above quote holds true for much of Third World psychology as well. Indigenization in Third World psychology departments, for the most part, means transporting and using the core aspects of Euro-American psychology—empiricism, experimentation, and quantitative measurements—in regard to a certain set of cultural issues (Enriquez, 1993; Moghaddam, 1987).

There are several definitions of what constitutes indigenous (or cultural) psychologies. Owusu-Bempah and Howitt (2000) suggested that in some instances authors equate indigenous psychologies with the psychological understanding that is embedded within traditional, and more commonly religious, conceptions and worldviews of self and society. In other situations, the researchers are much more interested in the development of a psychology that will help with the implementation of national government objectives. For others, the eventual integration of indigenous psychologies using comparative methods is part of the search for the grail. (Owusu-Bempah & Howitt, 2000, p. 29)

Thus, an indigenous Hindu psychology of personhood, for example, would emphasize the following:

Non-linear growth and continuity in life, behavior as transaction, the temporal and atemporal existence of human beings, spatiotemporally contextualized action, the search for eternity in life, the desirability of self-discipline, the transitory nature of human experience, control that is distributed rather than personalized, and a belief in multiple worlds (material and spiritual). (Gergen et al., 1996, p. 498)

The stock of indigenous psychologies embedded within, say, Hindu or Buddhist traditions have been largely neglected by Indian psychologists, and the Western metropolitan centers of psychology (mainly the United States) continue to play an important role in representing the non-Western subject (Naidu, 1994; Varma, 1995). The native psychologists in Third World societies continue to use the principles of Euro-American psychology to analyze and represent their own psychological realities along with the “psyche” of the indigenous populations. Such a transition shows the continuing cultural imperialism of Euro-American psychology and the lingering subservience of Third World psychologists to Euro-American psychology.

In the last 20 years, a few Euro-American and Third World psychologists have seriously examined the legitimacy of exporting Euro-American psychology as a universal science to non-Western societies (Blackler, 1983; Enriquez, 1993; Kim & Berry, 1993; Moghaddam, 1987; Owusu-Bempah & Howitt, 2000). Indian psychologists were critical, for example, of McClelland and Winter’s (1969) highly Eurocentric work on achievement motivation that they conducted in India in the 1960s (for a review, see J. B. P. Sinha, 1984). Similarly, Kakar’s (1996) pioneering work on Hindu conceptions of personhood, family, and psychological and spiritual healing traditions has contributed immensely in deconstructing the universal claims of psychoanalysis. However, most Indian and other non-Western psychologists continue to work within the confines of Euro-American psychology, and therefore the emergence of alternative indigenous psychologies on a global scale has either been nonexistent or very gradual.
Conclusion: The Past as a Prelude to the Future of Psychology

One of the main purposes of this article was to map out the historical role of psychology in unwittingly contributing to the ideology of colonization and imperialism. Furthermore, I attempted to show how the colonization of the natives gave way to the cultural imperialism of Western psychology in early and late postcolonial contexts. I highlighted how Indian psychologists had internalized British Orientalist images of the non-West and, with the process of “second colonization” in full swing in the postcolonial context, Western psychology was firmly transplanted onto Indian soil. This second colonization, which Said (1993) described as cultural imperialism, is deeply linked to, and consciously or unconsciously defined by, the contours of the colonization of the first kind, that is, Orientalism. On reaching the end of this article one may be tempted to find out what this story of Orientalism and second colonization means for the practice of contemporary international psychology in the 21st century. At this juncture, I do not intend to provide an exhaustive discussion about how one can create a genuine international psychology that is not completely embedded within the legacy of colonial psychology. Rather, I want to use the story of Orientalism and Euro-American psychology that was narrated here to make some general points that may invite reflection on the part of both Euro-American and non-Western psychologists.

First, it is important for Euro-American psychologists to acknowledge and highlight the historical role of psychology in unconsciously perpetuating Orientalist representations about non-Western others. Similarly, Third World psychologists need to recognize that the Euro-American brand of indigenous psychology has had a long history within the Third World academic universities, and it need not be simply replaced by new “indigenous” or “traditional” psychologies. What needs to be undertaken by both postcolonial and Western psychologists is a systematic historical investigation of the role of Euro-American psychology in directly or indirectly providing justification for the Orientalist agenda in both colonial and postcolonial contexts.

The second issue concerns itself with the meaning of the term indigenous psychologies, which needs to be clarified. Just as there is no singular monolithic, homogeneous Euro-American psychology, it would similarly be a mistake to conceptualize indigenous psychology as referring to one dominant set of psychological beliefs and practices. For example, there is an explicit assumption in Euro-American psychology that it is a universal psychology and that other cultures should use the model of psychology that is practiced in the West (Berry et al., 1992; Gergen et al., 1996). Such an assumption often overlooks the point that this brand of Euro-American psychology is based on certain a priori cultural assumptions about the construction of personhood (Heelas & Lock, 1981; Sampson, 1988). Furthermore, there are multiple forms of indigenous psychologies within Euro-American psychology, and many of these psychologies (e.g., experimental, feminist, narrative, discursive) operate with their own distinct underlying set of assumptions about how personhood is constructed.

Third, Euro-American psychologists need to forge a dialogue with Third World psychologists, because the population of non-Western, Third World dias-
poric communities living in the First World is expanding rapidly (Bhatia & Ram, 2001). Non-Western diasporic communities, such as Chinese Americans or Indian Americans, bring into sharp relief the sense of negotiating the hyphenated parts of their cultural identity. Such diasporic negotiations have not been adequately recognized or understood in the current acculturation models of psychology.

Fourth, when Euro-American concepts of personhood are transported to Third World cultures for purposes of cross-cultural investigations they become part of a one-way flow of knowledge from the Western countries to the Third World societies. The concepts and methodologies of cross-cultural research are often devised in North American or European psychology departments, and the collaborative other in a Third World country such as India, Turkey, or Kenya is merely seen as providing assistance in carrying out the research agenda of the psychologists from the developed countries (Moghaddam & Taylor, 1986). The reverse phenomenon rarely occurs.

Like their Euro-American counterparts, many non-Western psychologists have used culture as a variable in their research (Varma, 1995). The concept of culture operates within the confines of the core concepts of Euro-American psychology. Third World psychologists need to see the concept of personhood as a dynamic and shifting concept that is embedded within a larger sociocultural framework (Enriquez, 1993). A culturally situated theoretical framework has the potential to look within the “archives” of indigenous traditions, local practices, and community networks to find solutions for the everyday psychological difficulties (e.g., unemployment, ethnic and political strife) faced by individuals in Third World populations. The return to indigenous psychological traditions does not mean that all problems can be solved solely through those traditions. A truly meaningful collaboration between Western and Third World psychologists will, however, need to begin with the acknowledgment of their shared history within the context of Orientalism in colonial times and cultural imperialism in the postcolonial era.

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