The Handbook of Culture & Psychology

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How individuals exercise control over themselves, others, and their environments in their daily lives is an issue that strikes at the heart of individual psychology. Indeed, as described in this chapter, research from mainstream psychology has amply demonstrated that personal, primary control over self-related outcomes is related intimately to autonomy, individuality, self-concept, and self-esteem. Control processes are central to self-construals and are closely related to core social and cultural values we all have that serve as guiding principles in our lives.

In this chapter, Yamaguchi presents an excellent analysis of the issue of control. He takes us far beyond the simple notions of control typically presented in mainstream psychology by outlining not only direct, personal control (which is the type of control typically discussed in mainstream psychology), but also three other types of control agents: indirect, proxy, and collective control. Yamaguchi suggests that these other types of control agents are more prevalent in cultures that value interpersonal harmony over autonomy and individual agency and suggests that core cultural values encourage the development and use of differential control strategies as individuals attempt to master and adapt to their environments.

Yamaguchi also describes two different types of control targets—primary and secondary—and four subtypes for each. As he describes, in primary control, the target of control is existing external realities in one's physical and social environment. In secondary control, however, the target of control is oneself. Previous authors have claimed that East Asians attempt primary control less and secondary control more than do Americans. According to Yamaguchi, however, while this analysis is theoretically clear, the existing research does not support these claims. Instead, Yamaguchi presents a reconceptualization of these concepts and suggests that primary control would have functional primacy over secondary control only when an individual's biological needs are urgent or in a culture in which psychological well-being depends largely on a sense of autonomy. In particular, Yamaguchi's second illustration depicts how differing roads to psychological well-being may exist in different cultures, each with its own set of paths.

Needless to say, the analysis presented here by Yamaguchi is unique, intriguing, and insightful. In presenting his ideas and models, Yamaguchi is essentially arguing
for a reconceptualization of major psychological concepts such as self-esteem, self-concept, and self-construals within a multicultural model. He specifies different paths to essentially being, depending on the cultural context and core psychological values that are associated with those contexts, and demonstrates how individuals can move on one or more paths, depending on culture and values. This reconceptualization has major implications for redefining and recasting all research related to self and well-being across cultures, including, but not limited to, such topics as self-enhancement and self-efficacy. While couched in the framework of East-West distinctions, the models and ideas presented are applicable across cultures.

Yamaguchi's ideas also have multiple important ramifications for innovations in future empirical work. Testing ideas concerning collective self-efficacy, for example, would require designing ways of creating and measuring collective action and dealing with collective influences on individual data, for which current psychological methods and data analytic techniques fall far short. His ideas also force us to reexamine definitions of autonomy, well-being, and self-efficacy and, as such, may bring about necessary changes in the conduct of research on these constructs as well.

As Yamaguchi states, the two paths that he uses as examples in his important second illustration are not incompatible or mutually exclusive. As such, they bring with them the possibility that these paths, and others, coexist simultaneously in each individual, and people use the multiple paths differentially according to context and culture. If true, this would signify a major revision in our understanding of self and personality across cultures and would be a major step toward the creation of a pan-cultural psychology that resonates with the major theme of this volume.

At fifteen, I set my heart on learning.

At seventy, I followed my heart's desire without overstepping the line.

(Confucius/Lau, Analects, 1979, p. 63)

Harmony versus Autonomy

At the value level, Schwartz (1992) demonstrated in his value survey that social harmony (i.e., conformity, security, and tradition) is valued higher in a communal society like Taiwan than in a contractual society like New Zealand. On the other hand, the value of mastery, defined as "active mastery of the social environment through self-assertion" (Schwartz, 1994, p. 103), is valued more highly in the United States than in East Asian countries. Kwan, Bond, and Singelis (1997) showed that relationship harmony is a more important determinant of college student's self-esteem in Hong Kong than in the United States.

Not only do people in East Asia endorse harmony, the maintenance of harmony serves as an important guiding principle in their daily lives, such as teaching, filial piety, advertisements, discussions, and conflict resolutions.
Shigaki (1983) found that the most important value among Japanese nursery school teachers is to foster harmonious relationships. Sung (1994) compared filial motivation among Korean and American caregivers of elderly relatives. For Koreans, family harmony was an important motivation for caregiving to elderly relatives, whereas it was not mentioned by Americans. Han and Shavitt (1994) found that magazine advertisements in the United States appealed to individual benefits and preferences, whereas in Korea, advertisements appealed to in-group benefits, harmony, and family integrity. They also demonstrated in a follow-up experiment that ads emphasizing family or in-group benefits were less persuasive in the United States than in Korea.

Prunty, Klopf, and Ishi (1990a,b) found that Japanese university students were less argumentative, valued group harmony, and shunned controversy more than their American counterparts. According to Trubisky, Ting-Toomey, and Lin (1991), Taiwanese students prefer to resolve a conflict within an in-group by “obliging (e.g., going along with the suggestions of the group member),” “avoiding (e.g., staying away from disagreement with the group member),” “integrating (e.g., integrating ideas with the group member or coming up with a decision jointly),” and “compromising (e.g., trying to find a middle course to resolve an impasse)” compared to American students.

Leung and Lind (1986) also showed that undergraduates in the United States preferred the adversary procedure to the nonadversary procedure in conflict resolution, whereas such a difference was not found for Chinese undergraduates. Similarly, Ohbuchi, Fukushima, and Tedeschi (1999) asked American and Japanese college students to recall an experience of conflict and rate the episode on dimensions such as goal orientation, goal attainment, and tactics in their attempts at conflict resolution. Japanese students tended to avoid a confrontation with the other party, whereas American students tended to assert their request strongly. They found further that the most important goal for the Japanese students was to maintain a positive relationship with the other party, whereas restoration of fairness was the most important goal for the American students. Leung (1988) showed that Hong Kong Chinese tended to pursue a conflict less than Americans when a potential disputant is an in-group member. Leung (1987) further demonstrated that Hong Kong adults tended to perceive that mediation and bargaining could reduce animosity between disputants and preferred those procedures to a greater extent than American adults.

The foregoing brief review indicates that a core value in East Asia is the maintenance of harmony rather than autonomy. Although the maintenance of both interpersonal harmony and autonomy must be important in any culture, when the two values come into conflict, East Asians tend to value harmony more than autonomy. The main thrust of this chapter, therefore, is to understand control orientations among people, such as East Asians, who value a harmonious relationship with the social and physical environment in contrast with those who value autonomy to a greater extent than harmony, like North Americans.

More specifically, I focus on how the two cultural values affect individuals’ choice regarding who acts as an agent of control and what they attempt to change. As to the agent of control, it does not have to be the self. It can be another person or a collective of which one is a member. For example, individuals can repair their car in three different ways, depending on who does the job. First, one can fix the car by himself or herself. Second, one can bring it to a car dealer and ask them to fix it. Third, one can repair it collectively with family members or friends. In the following sections, I argue that one’s choice of agent is affected by the two cultural values that I discussed above. The target of control is also affected by cultural values. People’s target of control can be either themselves or the environment (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). Researchers have claimed that East Asians attempt to change themselves rather than the environment, whereas Westerners attempt to influence existing realities (e.g., Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984). I conceptually analyze the contentions of Rothbaum and Weisz and review relevant literature. Then, an agenda for future research is presented.

Concept of Control

Although control appears a very simple concept, there has not been a consensus among researchers regarding its definition (for a review, see Skinner, 1996). For example, it is defined cognitively by Thompson (1981) as the belief that one has at one’s disposal a response that can influence the aversiveness of an event (p. 89), whereas Skinner, Chapman, and Baltes (1988) defined control as the extent to which an agent can produce desired outcomes (p. 118).
As Skinner (1996) concluded after a comprehensive review of the control-related constructs, the prototype of control is personal control, in which the agent of control is the self. Thus, most researchers in this area may mean personal control when they simply refer to control. However, because the agent of control is not limited to the self, the prototypicality of personal control may reflect a cultural value that personal control is more desirable than other types of control due to its facilitative effect on one's autonomy. Therefore, I simply mean "causing an intended event" (Weisz et al., 1984, p. 958) when I refer to control because this definition is free of cultural values.

**Agent of Control**

An agent of control, in the present context, refers to a person or a collective who can cause a particular outcome. As such, the agent can be the self, powerful other(s), or a collective such as a group or organization. I discuss how considerations about autonomy and harmony would affect one's choice of the agent.

**Personal Control**

**Direct Personal Control**

People who value autonomy are assumed to prefer personal control, in which the self acts as an agent. Individuals would especially feel themselves more self-efficacious when their agency is made explicit, thus allowing them to feel their autonomy to a greater extent than otherwise. I refer to this type of control as direct personal control, as contrasted with indirect personal control, in which one's agency is hidden or played down (Table 12.1).

Previous theoretical and empirical research in North America has emphasized the importance of self-efficacy, which can be attained by successful direct personal control and can serve as the basis for one's sense of autonomy. White (1959) argued that people have an expectance of self-efficacy, which is satisfied by production of effective changes in the environment. His theory posits that individuals attempt to be agentic toward the environment, and when they are successful as an agent, they can feel satisfaction, a process that is called a feeling of efficacy. Bandura (1977) advanced this line of thought and argued that expectation of self-efficacy affects one's coping behavior. If one has confidence in his or her self-efficacy, he or she will initiate and persist in coping behavior and consequently attain autonomy. More generally, one's beliefs in self-efficacy, which is defined as "people's beliefs about their capabilities to exercise control over events that affect their lives" (Bandura, 1989, p. 1175), determines subsequent motivation, affect, and action (Bandura, 1989). In the cognitive domain, beliefs in self-efficacy lead one to set a higher goal and commit oneself in the attainment of that goal (e.g., Wood and Bandura, 1989). Motivationally, the belief in self-efficacy leads one to put more effort in one's enterprise (e.g., Bandura & Cervone, 1983), whereas in terms of emotion, those with high belief in self-efficacy feel less anxious in a stressful situation (e.g., Averill, 1973). Furthermore, Langer and Rodin (Langer & Rodin, 1976; Rodin & Langer, 1977) demonstrated that a feeling of control even can contribute to longevity; in their field study at a nursing home, mortality was found to be lower among aged residents who had been given the freedom to make choices and the responsibility of taking care of a plant relative to those who had not been given such choices and responsibility.

Not only do people bolster beliefs in their ability to control in response to successful con-

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**Table 12.1 Agency in Control Strategies and Their Likely Effect on Autonomy and Interpersonal Harmony**

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<td>Personal control</td>
<td></td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>The self acts as an agent explicitly</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>The self's agency is hidden</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proxy control</td>
<td>Someone else acts as an agent</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective control</td>
<td>A collective acts as an agent</td>
<td>Negative</td>
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trok of an event, but also they hold an unwarranted belief that they can control chance events in some circumstances. Langer (1975) showed that people perceive an illusion of control over chance events, which are uncontrollable by definition. In one of her experiments, adult male and female office workers were asked if they wished to purchase a lottery ticket costing $1, by which the winner could earn $50. After having agreed to enter the lottery, participants in the choice condition were allowed to select the ticket that they wanted, whereas the other participants in the no-choice condition were not given such a choice. On the morning of the lottery drawing, the participants were asked if they would like to sell their ticket to someone who wanted to get into the lottery. The mean price the participants named was $8.67 in the choice condition, and it was only $1.96 in the no-choice condition. This result indicates that participants in the choice condition had an illusion of control that they could choose the winning lottery ticket.

Given the compelling theoretical reasons and overwhelming empirical evidence indicating the prevalence of direct personal control attempts, there remains little room for questioning a strong orientation among Westerners toward direct personal control of the environment. Indeed, as noted above, personal control of one's physical and social environment is thought to be a prototype of control (Skinner, 1996). When it comes to East Asians, however, the story becomes more complicated due to the importance of interpersonal harmony.

Indirect Personal Control

Direct personal control attempts often cause interpersonal confrontations, which East Asians attempt to avoid (Ohbuchi et al., 1999; Trubinsky et al., 1991). For this reason, people who value interpersonal harmony would prefer indirect personal control to direct personal control when direct personal control of the environment is undesirable, but there is still a need or wish to control the environment. In indirect personal control, individuals hide or play down their agency by pretending that they are not acting as an agent while they are actually doing so. Kojima (1984) provided an excellent example of this kind of control attempt:

Suppose that a rakugo (comic story) master is annoyed by his disciple, who is singing a song too loudly. Instead of issuing a direct reprimand to stop it, he says, "How well you sing a song!" For a moment, the disciple is proud, taking his master's statement at its face value, but soon he becomes aware of the true meaning of the message. (p. 972)

In this episode, the rakugo master pretended that he was not acting as an agent, although he actually attempted to stop his disciple from singing. He hid his real intention and "praised" how well his disciple was singing. The rakugo master's indirect attempt to stop his disciple from singing has the merit of maintaining their close relationship by letting him become aware of it by himself. The disciple was not forced to stop his singing and thus could maintain his face.

The prevalence of such an attempt at indirect control is suggested by Muramoto and Yamaguchi (1997) with some empirical evidence. We found that Japanese attempt to enhance self-evaluation indirectly by group-serving attributions. In the previous research, it is well known that people make self-serving attributions in which they attribute success to their ability and attribute failure to an external cause, such as luck or task difficulty (Bradley, 1978; Miller & Ross, 1975), to attain positive self-evaluation.

Muramoto and Yamaguchi found that Japanese make self-effacing attributions about their performance, whereas they make group-enhancing attributions for their group's performance. This result indicates that Japanese do not always make self-effacing attributions. Rather, the result can be interpreted as an attempt to raise their self-evaluation indirectly by praising their in-group, while maintaining harmonious relationships with others by self-effacing attribution.

As social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982) posits, evaluation of one's in-group affects his or her social identity, which is defined as "that part of an individual's self-concept that derives from the individual's knowledge of his or her membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (p. 255). Because social identity is equivalent to one's "self-conception as a group member" (Abrams & Hogg, 1990), one can enhance one's self-evaluation by favorable evaluations of one's in-group. In this way, individuals can raise one's self-evaluation without disrupting group harmony.

Consistent with this interpretation, Muramoto and Yamaguchi (1999) have found that Japanese participants tend to evaluate their personal contribution to group success as equal to
or greater than that of the average group member, although they may not express this self-evaluation to their in-group members. This finding suggests that Japanese attempt to enhance self-esteem, albeit indirectly. This result also indicates that Japanese pretend that they are not acting as an agent, although in actuality they are acting agentially to enhance their self-esteem. If one can assume that the cost of direct personal control of self-evaluation is high, as suggested by previous research, then one would understand why Japanese indirectly attempt to enhance or protect their self-esteem. When it comes to group performance, one’s agency is diluted among in-group members; thus, attribution of group success is less agentic than attribution of personal performance. Muramoto and Yamaguchi’s findings indicate that Japanese do strive for higher self-evaluation, but through another route in which one’s agency is played down; thus, disruption of interpersonal harmony is less likely. It is quite conceivable that, in Japanese culture, one’s need for higher self-evaluation is masked by an even stronger need for maintenance of harmony and is fulfilled indirectly through group enhancement rather than self-enhancement.

Self-effacing attribution for one’s performance is not limited to Japanese. Researchers have maintained that humility is a norm in Chinese societies as well (for a review, see Leung, 1996). Farh, Dobbins, and Cheng (1991) have found, in line with Muramoto and Yamaguchi (1997), that Chinese employees in Taiwan rated their job performance less favorably than their supervisors did. In addition, Wan and Bond (1982) found that such self-effacing tendencies among Chinese disappeared in a public situation as far as luck is concerned, suggesting that the self-effacing attribution is an impression management tactic.

This empirical evidence suggests, despite recent arguments by Heine and his colleagues for lower self-concept among Japanese relative to North Americans (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Heine, Takata, & Lehman, 2000), that expressed low self-concept among Japanese and Chinese needs to be taken with reservations. They may just be following the humility norm prevalent in their societies and attempting to heighten their self-evaluation indirectly by showing that they are competent enough to understand and follow the cultural norm.

The previous research suggests, as a whole, that those who value interpersonal harmony would tend to choose indirect personal control in the fear that direct personal control attempts may cause interpersonal confrontations. For those who value autonomy, on the other hand, indirect personal control would not be an attractive choice because it is not conducive to their sense of autonomy even when it is implemented successfully. It becomes their choice, however, when direct personal control is unavailable. Lopez and Little (1996) reported that dependent children of U.S. military personnel in Germany tended to use indirect coping strategies (i.e., indirect control attempts) when they were faced with uncontrollable events.

**Proxy Control**

When exercise of personal control is neither readily available nor encouraged, one might well relinquish his or her direct control attempts and seek "security in proxy control" (Bandura, 1982, p. 142). *Proxy control* means control by someone else for the benefit of the person (Table 12.1).

For example, in third-party interventions, intermediaries are called in to regulate interpersonal relationships between parties with potential or actual conflict of interests. With the help of those intermediaries, people can gain a desired outcome without acting agentially. In this sense, those people are thought to use proxy control in third-party interventions. As the foregoing analysis of the reluctance of East Asians to use direct personal control suggests, third-party interventions would be preferred to a greater extent in East Asia than in the West. Indeed, according to Bian and Ang’s (1997) survey of 1,008 Chinese workers and 512 workers in Singapore, when a worker changes his or her job, intermediaries play an important role by bridging the job changers and their new employer.

Proxy control is essential for survival of those who are in a weaker position and thus are unable to change their environment to their liking. Because they do not have enough skills, knowledge, and power to bring about their desired outcome or avoid an undesired outcome in the environment, they cannot afford a means to control their environment other than proxy control. Thus, it would be of paramount importance for those in a weaker position, such as children and subordinates in an organization, to develop an ability to locate powerful others who can be induced to act in their benefit. For example, parents are powerful persons who can bring about a desired outcome for children.
Thus, a child would ask his or her parents to buy him or her an expensive toy. Likewise, a subordinate may ask his or her boss to negotiate with the chief executive officer of the company for a promotion. In those situations, people who seek proxy control are unable to exercise direct personal control. The child cannot afford to buy expensive goods, and the subordinate does not have a chance to negotiate with the chief executive officer regarding his or her promotion. Thus, they need to use proxy control if they wish to bring about a desired outcome in their environment.

Prevalence of proxy control in Asian contexts is reflected in a Japanese indigenous concept, Amae, which has been suggested by a Japanese psychoanalyst, Doi (1977), to be a key concept to understanding the Japanese mentality. In everyday use, Amae involves a person’s behavior that is not necessarily acceptable (Takeōmo, 1986). More precisely, individuals can presume that their inappropriate behavior would be accepted by their counterpart if they are in a close relationship with the counterpart. This presumption is called Amae among the Japanese (Yamaguchi, 1999).

For example, the child may expect his or her parents to buy an expensive toy because the parents love the child. The subordinate in a company, who wishes to be promoted, may expect his or her superior to accept a request for promotion because they have been in a friendly relationship, although the subordinate may not deserve promotion. In those examples, the requests are normally perceived as inappropriate by the counterparts. Nevertheless, the requesters or solicitors are attempting to get what they desire through a powerful other, such as parents, husband, or superordinate, because the counterparts are in a close relationship with them. It is important to note here that Amae typically involves a close relationship, such as with a close friend or a child-parent or husband-wife type of relationship. In close relationships, even inappropriate behaviors are often accepted, albeit within some limits. Thus, Amae among Japanese can be considered an attempt at proxy control, in which a benefactor accepts an inappropriate behavior or request that would hardly be accepted in other relationships.

Obviously, Amae or other types of proxy control will not foster the sense of self-efficacy in attaining the goal of control. Individuals in a proxy control situation have to relinquish their direct control over the environment and forgo an opportunity to acquire requisite skills (Bandura, 1982). A resulting low self-efficacy may well foster dependence on proxy control, which further reduces opportunities to build the skills needed for efficacious action (Bandura, 1997, p. 17). Thus, as far as one subscribes to the value of autonomy, proxy control is definitely undesirable because of its deteriorating effect on one’s autonomy.

However, if one gives priority to maintenance of harmony, a bright side of proxy control, including Amae, will emerge: Proxy control can have a beneficial effect on interpersonal relationships. If the benefactor successfully handles the situation for the requester’s benefit, it will foster a feeling of trust on the benefactors. The benefactor would also be able to feel that he or she is valued and trusted by the requester because the requester relinquished control and asked the benefactor for a favor.

Even in terms of self-efficacy, proxy control may not necessarily be detrimental. It can foster a feeling of self-efficacy in managing interpersonal relationships because proxy control entails social skills to locate a powerful other and induce the person to work on behalf of the requester. In this sense, proxy control should be distinguished from mere relinquishment of control. It can be conceived as a control attempt in which the real agent (i.e., self) is hidden. In proxy control, individuals know what they want, and they often use well-developed social skills to induce a potential benefactor to work on their behalf. For this reason, the situation is typically under the requester’s control rather than that of the benefactor. By using proxy control, individuals may get even what they normally cannot afford when they attempt personal control, as in the case of Amae.

Indeed, Kim and Yamaguchi (2001) have found that Japanese understand the double-edged sword nature of Amae: a detrimental effect on autonomy and a facilitative effect on interpersonal relationships. We asked more than 1,000 Japanese, including junior high, senior high, and college students, as well as adults, to answer questions about Amae in an open-ended questionnaire. The results indicated, as expected, that Japanese acknowledge both positive and negative aspects of Amae and consequently have an ambivalent attitude toward it. Japanese respondents associated positive feelings with Amae, such as like/love, acceptance, or trust, as well as negative feelings such as dependency, unpleasantness, selfishness, or childishness. The respondents also answered
that, in allowing Amae, there are positive aspects, such as a closer relationship and reciprocal benefit, as well as negative aspects, such as immaturity and trouble for the provider of benefit.

The Japanese respondents accepted Amae only in certain situations. As Taketomo (1986) maintained, Amae would be welcome and accepted only when both interactants agree. That is, acceptability of Amae would depend on closeness of the interpersonal relationship and context in which Amae is made. Amae appears to be a useful way to control individuals' physical and social environments, at least in Japan. Successfully implemented, Amae will enable powerless individuals to change their environment while maintaining interpersonal harmony.

**Collective Control**

In addition to indirect personal control and proxy control, there is another type of control that does not come into conflict with interpersonal harmony. In **collective control**, one attempts to control the environment as a member of a group or collective, which serves as an agent of control. Thus, members do not have to worry about maintenance of interpersonal harmony among in-group members because they share the goal of control (Table 12.1).

In East Asia, the unit of survival has been a group or collective rather than isolated individuals or nuclear families (Triandis, 1994). As the unit of survival, groups or collectives may well be autonomous agents. Indeed, Menon, Morris, Chiu, and Hong (1999) argue that East Asians perceive collectives as autonomous. They demonstrated, consistent with their argument, that East Asians tend to attribute the cause of various events more readily to group properties rather than personal properties. Chinese in Hong Kong attributed the cause of organizational scandals to group properties rather than individual properties, whereas their American counterparts showed the reverse tendencies.

In collective control, responsibility, as well as agency, will be diffused among actors (Latane & Darley, 1970). If everyone in a collective is responsible for the outcome to the same extent, no one will have to take responsibility for a negative outcome personally. Although no one can claim responsibility for a positive outcome either, it would be exactly what East Asians prefer. Muramoto and Yamaguchi (1997) showed that Japanese prefer to attribute success to their group members, indicating that Japanese do not claim personal responsibility for their successful performance in a group. People can maintain harmony among in-group members by sharing responsibilities for the outcome regardless of its valence.

Not only are groups perceived as agents, but also East Asians have a belief that they are more efficacious as a collective than as a person (Earley, 1989, 1993). Earley (1989) asked managerial trainees from the United States and the People's Republic of China to work on an additive task (Steiner, 1972), such as writing memos and making priorities for client interviews. He predicted and found that social loafing (i.e., reduced effort in a collective task as compared with an individualized task) appeared among individualistic Americans, as shown by Latane, Williams, and Harkins (1979), whereas it did not appear among collectivistic Chinese. It was also found that the Chinese participants worked harder in a group than when working alone, especially in settings with high shared responsibility in which the participants were given a specified group goal. He interpreted the results as indicating that Chinese give priority to group goals and collective action rather than their self-interests, whereas the reverse would be the case with Americans.

Earley (1993) advanced this line of interpretation and further demonstrated that nonoccurrence of social loafing among Chinese is related to an individual's perceived group efficacy, which is defined as a person's expectation about a group's capability. In this experiment, managers from the United States and China were asked to perform simulated managerial activities as in Earley's 1989 study under one of three conditions of group membership: alone, in-group, or out-group. In the in-group and out-group conditions, the participants were led to believe that they were working with either in-group members or out-group members. For the Chinese participants, performance was significantly higher in the in-group condition than in the out-group or alone condition, whereas for the American participants, performance was significantly higher in the alone condition than in the other two conditions. Corresponding to the result on performance, the Chinese participants perceived group efficacy in the in-group condition was higher than that of the American participants. Hence, the results suggest that the Chinese participants worked harder in the in-group condition because they have a belief in group efficacy.
Such beliefs in collective efficacy may well lead people to create an illusion of collective control among them. Yamaguchi (1998) hypothesized that Japanese would tend to estimate risk unjustifiably lower in a collective setting than when they are alone. In the first experiment, Japanese female participants were asked to estimate a risk level in fictitious situations described in a vignette with a varied number of risk companions who are exposed to the same risk source. For example, the participants were asked to estimate the probability of getting cancer assuming that they were drinking water contaminated with carcinogens either alone or with a small number or a large number of risk companions. As the reader should be aware by now, there is absolutely no normative ground to expect that the number of risk companions affects the probability that one gets cancer. Nevertheless, the participants estimated that the risk level would be lower with more risk companions. In the second study, the finding was successfully replicated in a laboratory setting in which participants were exposed to a real risk of electric shocks. This group diffusion effect of risk perception has been replicated in Hong Kong using essentially the same vignettes (Amy & Leung, 1998).

Yamaguchi, Gelfand, Mizuno, and Zemba (1997) examined more directly if Japanese overestimate their collective efficacy and Americans, especially males, overestimate self-efficacy. We predicted that Japanese hold a belief that their collective control is more efficacious than their personal control, whereas Americans, especially males, would hold the opposite belief, that their personal control is more efficacious than their collective control.

In the experiment, participants were told that the experiment was concerned with the effect of an unpleasant experience on the subsequent task performance. Ostensibly for this purpose, the participants were told that they would be assigned either to a control condition or to an unpleasant experience condition, depending on the result of lottery drawings. It was explained that they would be asked to take a bitter drink in the unpleasant experience condition, whereas they would not have to take the drink in the control condition.

Actually, there were two conditions: alone and group. In the alone condition, each participant was asked to draw four lottery tickets, on each of which a one-digit number was given. In the group condition, on the other hand, the participant was told that he or she was a member of a four-person group with the other three participants in the other rooms. An experimenter explained that each of the four members of the group would draw one lottery ticket. It was explained both in the alone and group conditions that the participant's assignment to the conditions would be determined by the sum of the four numbers given on the four lottery tickets. That is, the experimental situation was controlled so that in both the alone and group conditions the chance level of getting into the unpleasant condition was the same. The participants in the alone condition drew four tickets alone, whereas the participants in the group condition were led to believe that each of the four members would draw one lottery ticket. As in Yamaguchi (1998), there was no normative ground for the participants to believe that the sum of the four digits would be affected by who drew the lottery tickets. The dependent variable was the participant's estimate of the likelihood that they would eventually be assigned to the unpleasant condition and have to take a bitter drink.

The results indicated, as expected, that the Japanese participants in the group condition estimated their likelihood of being assigned to the unpleasant condition was lower than those in the alone condition, whereas the reverse tendency was the case with American male participants. The American female participants showed the same tendency as their Japanese counterparts: They overestimated their collective efficacy relative to their self-efficacy.

Although the result for the American females may appear perplexing, it can be explained in terms of the value to which American females subscribe. Gilligan (1993) argued that females in the United States value interpersonal relatedness to a greater extent than males, and they are less psychologically separated from others compared with American males. Consistent with Gilligan's argument, Beutel and Marini (1995) reported that, among U.S. high school seniors between 1977 and 1991, female respondents were more likely than male respondents to express concern and responsibility for the well-being of others and less likely than male respondents to accept materialism and competition. It is conceivable, therefore, that females in the United States are more like East Asians in the sense that they value maintenance of interpersonal relationships and care for others. Such orientations may well lead American females to foster general beliefs in collective efficacy. The issue of gender difference in control
developmentally, a sense of self-efficacy is fostered in one's socialization process (Bandura, 1989, 1997). When a baby is born, the baby does not have any sense of self-efficacy. Infants gradually develop a sense of self-efficacy based on the contingency between their behavior and outcome. Because the contingency between behavior and its outcome is often influenced by parents, teachers, or other powerful adults, one's sense of self-efficacy is thought to be influenced by the cultural milieus in which he or she is raised. If the contingency between infants behavior and outcome is constructed or emphasized as in the United States, they will grow up with a high sense of self-efficacy. On the other hand, if adults stress and construct a contingency between collective behavior and outcome, children will develop a relatively stronger sense of collective efficacy (i.e., that collectives are more efficacious in influencing the environment). Once established, this sense of collective efficacy would function as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, Chinese tend to believe in collective efficacy and put more effort in collective settings than when alone (Earley, 1993), which makes the collective more efficacious than the individual.

In sum, it appears quite reasonable for East Asians to prefer collective control to personal control for at least three reasons. First, in collective control, individuals are not perceived as an agent, and thus they can avoid interpersonal conflicts. Second, they hold a self-fulfilling belief that a collective effort is more efficacious than that of individuals. Third, collective control can facilitate interpersonal harmony with in-group members because their personal goals are compatible with the group goals.

As to the agency of control, three possibilities were suggested in addition to direct personal control, which has been claimed to be important in Western cultural milieus. As summarized in Figure 12.1, emphasis on the maintenance of interpersonal harmony would lead individuals to adopt the lower route through indirect personal control, proxy control, and collective control strategies. On the other hand, emphasis on autonomy would encourage one to adopt the upper route through direct personal control strategies. Previous research and present discussions suggest that the upper route is more prevalent among people who tend to value interpersonal harmony more than individual autonomy.

Target of Control

Individuals in any culture need to adjust their relationship with the physical and social environments for their physiological and psychological well-being. In doing so, individuals attempt to change either the physical and social environments or themselves. Rothbaum et al. (1982) and Weisz et al. (1984) proposed an important distinction between the two kinds of control attempt, primary control and secondary control. In primary control, the target of control is existing external realities in one's physical and social environments. Individuals attempt to "enhance their rewards by influencing existing realities (e.g., other people, circumstances, symptoms, or behavior problems)" by means of "personal agency, dominance, or even aggression" (Weisz et al., 1984, p. 955). In secondary control, on the other hand, the target of control is oneself. Individuals attempt to "enhance their rewards by accommodating to existing realities and maximizing satisfaction or goodness of fit with things as they are without changing the existing realities" (Weisz et al., 1984, p. 955).

By extending the meaning of control to include secondary control, they made a seminal contribution to the advancement of conceptual and empirical research in this area. Specifically, in the present context, they applied the distinction to cultural differences in control orientations. Weisz et al. (1984) argued that primary control plays an important role in everyday life in the United States, whereas secondary control does so in Japan. As to the differences in control orientations in the East and West, the arguments of Weisz et al. (1984) suggest that (a) East Asians would attempt primary control to a lesser extent because they perceive primary control as both less feasible and less desirable than do Americans, and (b) East Asians would attempt to exert secondary control to a greater extent than do Americans. In the following sections, available evidence is examined after the meaning of the two kinds of control is elaborated.

Primary Control

According to Rothbaum et al. (1982), both primary and secondary control includes four types
of control: predictive, illusory, vicarious, and interpretive (Table 12.2). In predictive primary control, individuals attempt to predict events so that they will succeed at them. An example of this type of control would be to predict the next move that one's opponent will make in a chess game. By predicting the opponent's move correctly, one will have a better chance to beat the opponent. In illusory primary control, individuals attempt to control an uncontrollable event like an event determined by chance. The superstitious behavior of gamblers would be included in this category. A gambler may continue to wear a dirty hat that he or she wore 10 years ago at the time of a big winning bet in the belief that the hat brings good fortune. Vicarious primary control is equivalent to proxy control in that it includes an attempt to manipulate powerful others. Last, interpretive primary control refers to attempts at understanding problems to solve or master them.

In discussing primary control, it should be noted that proxy control, or vicarious primary control in the terminology of Rothbaum et al. (1982), is included in the original classification of primary control attempts (Rothbaum et al., 1982). Proxy control is unique in that the agent is some powerful other(s) rather than oneself. Because proxy control is detrimental for development of skills required for personal control and thus would neither be valued nor preferred in the United States (Bandura, 1997), the argument of Weisz et al. (1984) that primary control is more prevalent in the United States than in Japan appears logically untenable. Indeed, available empirical evidence indicates that the suggestion of Weisz et al. (1984) face a serious problem when examined empirically.

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<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Example</th>
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<tr>
<td>Predictive</td>
<td>Predict an opponent's move to win a game</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vicarious (proxy)</td>
<td>Manipulate a powerful other to obtain something</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illusory</td>
<td>Gambler's superstitious behavior</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interpretive</td>
<td>Understand a problem to solve it</td>
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By using their scale of primary and secondary control, Seginer, Trommsdorff, and Essau (1993) compared control beliefs of Malaysian students with those of North American and German students. Their Malaysian sample consisted mostly of Iban and Malay students, whose religions emphasize the importance of harmonious interpersonal relationships (Seginer et al., 1993). Thus, their Malaysian participants are thought to endorse the value of harmonious relationships. Their result did not provide support for the suggestion of Weisz et al. (1984). In terms of total primary control beliefs, contrary to the expectation of the researchers, Malaysians scored higher than Germans, and no difference was found between Malaysians and North Americans. Furthermore, it was found that the Malaysian students scored higher than both the North American and German students on the vicarious primary control (i.e., proxy control) dimension. This result indicates, as the foregoing discussion suggests, that Malaysians tend to control the environment through someone else (proxy control) rather than directly.

In one of Weisz's empirical studies, McCarty et al. (1999) compared stress coping strategies of 6- to 14-year-olds in Thailand and the United States. Because the Thai child is taught from an early age not to “disturb their personal equilibrium by expressing one’s own feelings or wishes overtly” (p. 810), the results from Thai children are thought to be suggestive of East Asian coping strategies. Regarding primary control, they found no difference between children in the two cultures. One important result again was that Thai children reported more than twice as much covert (i.e., indirect) coping as their American counterparts. This result indicates that Thai children exert indirect personal control rather than giving up their influence on the realities, as Japanese students enhance self-evaluation indirectly (Muramoto & Yamaguchi, 1999). Such results led McCarty et al. (1999) to conclude

Thai youngsters were more likely than Americans to use covert coping methods when interacting with adults, but they were not more likely than Americans, in these situations, to adopt secondary control goals or to relinquish control. In other words, it would not be correct to assume that the deferent, subtle, indirect forms of coping employed by Thai youth in these situations imply a lack of investment in exerting influence or causing events to turn out as they wish. A more accurate view may be that Thai youth were following the social norms of appropriate outward behavior towards adults while maintaining goals that involved just as much primary control as those of American youth. (p. 816)

Nakamura and Flammer (1999) compared control orientations of Swiss students and Japanese students. When it comes to active problem-solving strategies, which can be classified as interpretive primary control, Swiss students had a higher orientation than their Japanese counterparts. This result indicates that, in a specific primary control strategy such as interpretive primary control, Japanese are less inclined to use primary control relative to Westerners.

Overall, previous empirical research is scarce and has not demonstrated that Japanese or East Asians are motivated to use primary control in general to a lesser extent relative to Americans or Westerners. Although undoubtedly cultural milieus affect individuals’ choice of control strategies, we should not ignore the fact that individuals in any culture need to pursue control over the environment for their subsistence. Hence, it is not surprising that the concept of primary control cannot appropriately differentiate control orientations in the East and West. Differences in primary control orientations in the East and West would not reside in its prevalence in one culture relative to others, but in the type of agents and ways individuals can afford or prefer in their respective cultural milieu, as suggested in previous sections.

The claim of Weisz et al. (1984) would be most appropriately taken as suggesting the relative prevalence of direct personal control of the environment in the United States rather than primary control in general. Although this interpretation of the argument of Weisz et al. is inconsistent with their original definition of primary control, subsequent researchers appear to have adopted it already. For example, when Heckhausen and Shultz (1995) characterized primary control as involving “direct action on the environment” (p. 285), they undoubtedly departed from the original definition of Rothbaum et al. (1982) by excluding vicarious primary control and illusory primary control. Heckhausen and Shultz essentially meant personal control of the environment by primary control.

A more viable hypothesis, therefore, would be that direct personal control of the environment is more prevalent in the West than in East Asia. That is, Westerners would prefer to exert direct personal control much more than East
Asians when the target of control is the environment. This hypothesis is discussed in more detail below.

**Secondary Control**

The second component of the arguments of Weisz et al. (1984) was that secondary control would be more prevalent in East Asian cultures relative to American culture. To examine the validity of this hypothesis appropriately, it is again essential that we take a closer look at the nature of secondary control. Weisz et al. suggested four kinds of secondary control as in primary control (Table 12.3).

*Predictive secondary control* refers to the accurate prediction of events and conditions so that one can control their psychological impact on the self. For example, one may attempt to know how a dentist will treat his or her decayed tooth before visiting the dentist to reduce the negative impact of the treatment. In this case, the target of control is fear or other negative feelings that may accompany a dental treatment. Generally, the target of predictive secondary control is the psychological impact of external events.

In *vicarious secondary control*, on the other hand, individuals attempt to gain a feeling of self-efficacy by aligning with powerful others or groups who can make accomplishments that the individual cannot afford. In this type of control, the target is one's feeling of self-efficacy. A good example of this type of control is provided by Cialdini et al. (1976). They demonstrated that college students tend to show their associations with successful others. In one of their experiments, college students were found to wear school-identifying apparel after the victory of the football team. By basking in reflected glory (BIRGing), the college students could foster a sense of self-efficacy, albeit illusory. This type of control can be considered proxy control of internal states, in this case, a feeling of self-efficacy.

As to *illusory secondary control*, the definitions of Rothbaum et al. (1982) and Weisz et al. (1984) are not consistent. In Rothbaum et al., this type of control was defined as a person's attempt to align themselves with the force of chance so that they may share in the control exerted by that powerful force (p. 17). According to this definition, the control target was once again one's sense of self-efficacy as in vicarious secondary control. On the other hand, illusory secondary control was defined by Weisz et al. as an individual's attempts to associate or get into synchrony with chance to enhance comfort with and acceptance of one's fate (p. 957). According to this new definition, the target of control is one's feelings associated with acceptance of his or her fate. For example, a dying cancer patient may accept his or her fate and stop fighting against it. By doing so, the patient will be able to control emotions, such as fear of death, and restore his or her peace of mind. If illusory secondary control refers to this type of coping, it would be more appropriately termed *accommodative secondary control* because it does not involve any illusion about control, and most likely the goal of control is to restore one's peace of mind.

Finally, in *interpretive secondary control*, individuals attempt to derive a meaning or purpose from existing realities and thereby enhance their satisfaction with those realities. An extreme case of such control would be an attempt by a Japanese Zen priest named Kaisen in the medieval period. When he was executed by fire, he reportedly uttered, "If you train your mind to disregard agony, you will find even fire cool." In more ordinary life, when we make a mistake or fail at something, we would attempt to derive a meaning from the mistake or failure and justify it. For example, a student who failed a final exam may think, "It is all right that I did not get credit for the course. I have learned a lot in the class anyway." Thus, in interpretive secondary control, the target of

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<th>Table 12.3 Target in Secondary Control Strategies</th>
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<td>Predictive</td>
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<td>Vicarious (proxy)</td>
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<td>Interpreive</td>
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control is the psychological impact of one's experience. The extant empirical evidence on cultural differences in secondary control is again scarce, and the results are mixed. Seginer et al. (1993) found that secondary control beliefs are stronger among Malaysian adolescents than German or North American adolescents. In Nakamura and Flammer's (1998) comparison between problem-solving strategies of Swiss and Japanese students, reinterpretation strategies, which can be classified as interpretive secondary control, were found more often among Japanese students than Swiss students. However, McCarty et al. (1999) did not find any consistent secondary control attempts among Thai youths compared to American youths.

In an attempt to compare control orientations directly among Americans and Japanese, Morling (2000) asked questions of participants in aerobics classes in Japan and the United States. Being asked what they would do in a class when the moves get too difficult, both Japanese and American participants answered that they were most likely to try harder to keep up with the instructor. Because the author operationally defined this response as the measure of their secondary control attempt, the result indicates that secondary control was dominant in the aerobics class in both cultures. The second most reported response, however, was more frequently primary control (i.e., to change the move to something they like) among Americans than Japanese.

In all, the previous research on cultural differences in secondary control strategies provides mixed results and thus does not allow us to draw any conclusion. Perhaps the conceptual ambiguity of secondary control and resulting diversity in its operationalization are responsible for the mixed results. Because the specific target in the four types of secondary control is diverse (see Table 12.3), we need to examine which cognitive or emotional component of the self individuals would wish to control in each culture. For example, in the case of vicarious secondary control, one is not motivated to accommodate the self to the existing realities. In this type of control, the goal is supposed to be to maintain one's sense of self-efficacy and to continue to believe that he or she has a capability to influence the reality. Such a control strategy would be more preferred by those who value autonomy.

Although the distinction of Weisz et al. (1984) between primary and secondary control is conceptually clear, this dichotomy cannot be readily applicable to cultural differences in control orientations. As we have seen, their claim that "primary control is more valued and prevalent in the United States, whereas in Japan secondary control has been more central in everyday life" (p. 955), cannot be sustained conceptually or empirically. It is not primary control per se that is valued in the United States. Nor is it secondary control per se that is valued in Japan particularly or East Asia in general. Primary and secondary control need to be distinguished from cultural values.

**Primacy of Primary Control or Secondary Control**

The present review has implications for recent debates on the primacy of primary control over secondary control (Gould, 1999; Heckhausen & Shultz, 1995, 1999). Heckhausen and Shultz (1995) argued in their theory of lifetime development that primary control has functional primacy over secondary control. Because the target of primary control is one's environment, they maintained that "it enables individuals to shape their environment to fit their particular needs and developmental potential" (p. 286). On the other hand, they argued, the adaptive value of secondary control is limited to its compensatory function (Heckhausen & Shultz, 1995). When people experience a threat to self-esteem or self-efficacy due to failed or unavailable primary control, secondary control is assumed to ameliorate the negativity of this threat and "preserve and rekindle the individual's motivational resources for maintaining and enhancing primary control in the future" (Heckhausen & Shultz, 1995, p. 286). According to their view, "the primacy of primary control is invariant across cultures and historical time" (p. 286).

Before we discuss their claim for the primacy of primary control, it would be appropriate to remind the reader that Heckhausen and Shultz (1995) characterized primary control as involving "direct action on the environment" (p. 285). That is, they did not include proxy control, in which someone else attempts to control the environment. Thus, they essentially argued for the primacy of direct primary control over secondary control rather than primacy of primary control in general.

More recently, Gould (1999) criticizes Heckhausen and Shultz (1995), arguing that they constructed their theory largely in biologically
driven terms (p. 600) and ignored cultural perspectives. Obviously, control over the environment is essential for human survival. Hence, one can legitimately advance an argument that primary control is indispensable for human subsistence. It does not follow, however, that direct primary control is more adaptive than secondary control in any cultures or in any situations. Gould and my foregoing analysis suggest that secondary control can be more adaptive than direct personal control of the environment (which Heckhausen & Shultz, 1995, meant by primary control) in East Asia for at least two reasons. First, secondary control can contribute to the advancement of individual's mental and biological strength. For example, Chang, Chua, and Toh (1997) have found that the tendency to use secondary control is associated with lower test anxiety among those in Singapore. It is quite conceivable that successful control of one's emotions would be associated with lower test anxiety. In addition, when individuals have some specific goal, they would attempt to improve their abilities to catch up with the standard set by an expert. American and Japanese participants in an aerobics class, who attempted to catch up with their instructor (Morling, 2000), must have improved their ability in aerobics over those who exerted primary control and moved to a lower level class that matched their present ability of aerobics. Undoubtedly, results of secondary control such as improved ability, resilient personality, mental stamina, and increased physical strength, would be beneficial for one's adaptation in the future.

Second, secondary control would also make a contribution to the advancement of psychological well-being by fostering a sense of self-efficacy in terms of controlling oneself and maintaining interpersonal harmony. When individuals have successfully controlled their internal state, such as their desires or emotions, it may well foster a sense of self-efficacy in terms of controlling oneself, which would heighten one's psychological well-being. In addition, if one can maintain harmonious relationships with the environment as a result of successful secondary control, the sense of self-efficacy in maintaining harmony will also be fostered and thus would advance the person's sense of psychological well-being. That is, an individual's psychological well-being can be heightened by the sense of self-efficacy in self-control and maintenance of harmonious relationships with the environment, as far as they subscribe to the value of harmonious relationships with the environment, which will be arguably facilitated by secondary control. Indeed, in Korea, Kim and Park (1998) developed a scale to measure the sense of self-efficacy in maintaining interpersonal relations and social harmony based on Bandura's (1997) conceptualization. They found that their Relational Efficacy and Social Harmony Efficacy Scale is correlated positively with life satisfaction and negatively correlated with stress among Korean high school students. It is important that psychological well-being can be gained without the risk of direct confrontations by using secondary control. Thus, in a culture in which people value harmonious interpersonal relationships, secondary control can be more adaptive if immediate biological needs are not at issue.

Probably the most important assumption in the theory of Heckhausen and Shultz (1995) is that psychological well-being is dependent solely on one's sense of autonomy, which is closely related to his or her sense of self-efficacy and self-esteem. Although they did not state this explicitly, it appears at least to the present author that their argument makes use of an assumption that is shared by many Western researchers. If a theorist stipulates the indispensability of the sense of autonomy for psychological well-being, it would follow that one's psychological well-being can be enhanced only in response to one's direct and personal control attempt, which had brought about desired outcomes in the environment. On the other hand, if a theorist assumes only that a sense of successful adaptation is enough for one's psychological well-being, any primary or secondary control strategies can be claimed to bring about one's psychological well-being.

Figure 12.2 illustrates the two alternative routes to psychological well-being. The upper route describes a route that would be chosen by those who value autonomy. Alternatively, the lower route describes a route to psychological well-being through a strategy of successful adaptation that does not require autonomy. The lower route does not entail changes in one's environment for increased psychological well-being, although it does not exclude primary control. As far as direct personal control attempts do not disrupt harmony, individuals who value harmony would exert such attempts. For example, they will not hesitate to open a window in their room when they feel hot, although they may hesitate to do so when they are not alone in
the room and are uncertain about how others feel about the room temperature.

Primary control would have functional primacy over secondary control only when an individual's biological needs are urgent or when they are in a culture in which their psychological well-being depends largely on their sense of autonomy, which can be bolstered by their capability in exerting direct and personal control over the environment. On the other hand, when an individual's biological needs are not urgent or they are in a culture in which their psychological well-being is determined primarily by their ability to fit well in the environment, secondary control would be able to heighten one's psychological well-being if the individual values harmony with the environment.

Future Agenda for Empirical Research

Admittedly, this chapter has raised more questions than it has answered. The lack or scarcity of empirical evidence in this area, however, should not be taken as indicating that the area is infertile and does not deserve empirical research. On the contrary, many important empirical questions await our merited research attentions. Some of these questions are highlighted in the following section.

Agency and Target of Control

I have suggested in this chapter that we need to broaden our framework beyond the now-popular primary-secondary control distinction so it can incorporate control orientations of those who value harmony more than autonomy. One of my suggestions is that indirect personal control, proxy control, and collective control strategies are available and actually used in place of direct personal control when individuals attempt to control the environment. Based on the foregoing discussions, one can predict cross-cultural, as well as individual, differences in the choice of control strategies: (a) East Asians, who tend to value harmony more than autonomy, would use control strategies other than direct personal control, which in turn would be preferred to a greater extent by North Americans, who tend to value autonomy relative to interpersonal harmony; (b) the more individuals value interpersonal harmony relative to autonomy, the more they would tend to use control strategies other than direct personal control. These predictions suggest an interesting possibility that the apparent cross-cultural and gender differences in control orientations can be reduced to individual differences in subscribed values.
The effect of each control strategy on one's sense of autonomy and interpersonal harmony would be invariant across cultures. That is, the likely effect of successful control attempts presented in Table 12.1 would be applicable to any culture, as well as the effect of secondary control. In any culture, successfully implemented indirect personal control, proxy control, and collective control would contribute to the maintenance of interpersonal harmony. This possibility would deserve future empirical attention as well.

We would also need to identify targets of secondary control in future research so we can understand the motivations underlying secondary control attempts. Depending on the situation, one's control attempts would be targeted at different aspects of an individual's cognition or emotions. For example, if one is motivated to heighten his or her sense of self-efficacy, he or she may well attempt to do so vicariously, as shown in the BIRGing phenomenon. This type of secondary control needs to be differentiated from other types of secondary control attempts, which may be aimed at restoring one's peace of mind.

### Self-Efficacy and Autonomy

It is evident that direct personal control can foster a sense of self-efficacy. That is, direct personal control will certainly foster one's belief that he or she is capable of exercising control over important life events. However, the effect of other types of control on one's sense of self-efficacy is not so clear. I have suggested that a specific sense of self-efficacy can be fostered by other types of control: self-efficacy in managing interpersonal relationships (proxy control), self-efficacy in self-control (secondary control), and self-efficacy in maintaining harmony (secondary control). Because indirect personal control, proxy control, and collective control are thought to be conducive to the maintenance of harmony, they may also foster a sense of self-efficacy in maintaining harmony. One might ask if these specific senses of self-efficacy are the same as the kind of self-efficacy bolstered by direct personal control. As to the sense of self-efficacy in maintaining interpersonal harmony, Kim, Park, and Kwak (1998) have developed a scale and found that it is positively correlated with life satisfaction. This result indicates that it makes sense to discuss self-efficacy in relation to maintaining harmony, although its relationship to one's general self-efficacy has yet to be explored empirically.

The existence of the other kinds of self-efficacy remains a question for future research as well. In addition to self-efficacy in self-control and managing interpersonal relationships, one might wonder if collective efficacy means collective self-efficacy, which may mean self-efficacy in collectively controlling events. It would also be challenging to design empirical research to answer this question.

The relationship between various types of self-efficacy and autonomy is another issue that needs to be examined. It is quite conceivable that one's self-efficacy bolstered by direct personal control can promote his or her sense of autonomy. However, how about the effect of the other types of self-efficacy on one's sense of autonomy? For example, if one has a sense of self-efficacy in maintaining interpersonal harmony, does it mean that he or she can feel autonomous? Because autonomy means that one is not being controlled by others and can make an independent judgment, it remains uncertain if mere capability to maintain interpersonal harmony makes a person free from influence of others.

### Motivations Underlying Control Attempts

The foregoing discussions suggest that control attempts, in both the East and the West, would be affected by considerations other than a mere desire to control the environment or the self. As shown in Figure 12.2, in the lower route to psychological well-being, individuals would be motivated to maintain harmony with the environment while they adjust their relationships with the social and physical environments. On the other hand, in the upper route, psychological well-being would entail a sense of autonomy. In both routes, it is assumed that individuals are motivated to attain psychological well-being in addition to the immediate target of control (i.e., of the self or the environment). Interesting predictions might be derived from this model.

First, the model suggests that a sense of autonomy is not a requirement for one's psychological well-being as far as one takes the lower route of Figure 12.2. Although autonomy may constitute an essential ingredient of adaptation in the West, this model suggests that one can attain psychological well-being without it. For people who take the lower route, a harmonious relationship with the environment is assumed to be more important than the sense of autonomy. Thus, it is plausible that one's self-con-
cept is affected by one's ability in attaining harmonious relationships rather than autonomy. If so, one's self-esteem may be determined by his or her ability to keep harmonious relationships with the environment rather than a capability to change the environment.

Second, desirability of behavior would depend on the route that one chooses. If one takes the upper route of Figure 12.2, one would need to achieve control of the environment personally to obtain the sense of autonomy. Thus, the kind of behavior that maximizes the chance of bringing about changes personally would be most preferred. On the other hand, in the lower route, the kind of behavior that maximizes the chance of a harmonious relationship with the environment would be most preferred as far as one's biological needs are not emergent.

Third, the model suggests a possibility that one does not have to stick to one route. That is, one may try both routes to psychological well-being or change the route, depending on the situation. For example, Uichol Kim (personal communication, February 17, 2000) has found that self-efficacy in maintaining interpersonal harmony, as measured by his scale, is correlated positively with life satisfaction among Germans, as well as Koreans. This result suggests that Germans can attain psychological well-being through the lower route of Figure 12.2, as well as probably the upper route. It might be more adaptive if one could pursue both routes to his or her psychological well-being. Although East Asians are typically supposed to pursue the lower route to psychological well-being, they could also pursue the upper route. Because both autonomy and harmony with the environment must be important in any culture, the two routes described in Figure 12.2 are not incompatible. It would be a challenging idea that both routes are available to individuals regardless of the cultural milieus in which they have been raised.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I critically reviewed theoretical and empirical research on cultural differences in control orientations. In doing so, I attempted to understand the differences in terms of the cultural values of autonomy and harmony to which people subscribe. Although the available evidence is as yet too sparse for strong conclusions to be made, some similarities and differences in control orientations between those who subscribe to autonomy versus those who subscribe to harmony are suggested. The general conclusion of this chapter is that a broader perspective would be necessary for comprehensive understanding of control orientations across cultures. The model illustrated in Figure 12.2 is a first step toward this end.

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