

 [Debate by Carl Martin Allwood](#) by Louise S. [2013, Jun 24]

Dear All,

Below please find the link to my answer to prof K.K. Hwang's debate paper Hwang, K.-K. (2013). Linking science to culture: Challenge to psychologists. *Social Epistemology*, 27 (1), 105-122.

Allwood, C.M. (2013). The Role of Culture and Understanding in Research. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective*, 2 (5), 1-11.

<http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-JL>

This was an invited response to Hwang, K.-K. (2013). Linking science to culture: Challenge to psychologists. *Social Epistemology*, 27 (1), 105-122.

Any comments are welcome!

Best wishes,

Carl Martin

 [Comment by Scott D. Churchill](#) by Louise S. [2013, Jun 24]

Interesting discussion!

The use of the expression "lifeworld" might benefit from consulting the originator of this term, who as far as I can tell would be Edmund Husserl. The term is given treatment in his *Crisis of European Sciences* but also more recently in the 39th volume of *Husserliana*, devoted entirely to *The Lifeworld (Interpretations of the Pre-given World and its Constitution)*.

For those with reading ability in German, here is the reference:

Die Lebenswelt : Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution / Edmund Husserl. Ed. by Rochus Sowa. - Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2008.

ISBN 978-1-402-06477-7

Buchausg. u.d.T.: Husserl, Edmund: *Die Lebenswelt*

Also, it struck me that the debate about the "existence" of microworlds, etc. might be

clarified with reference to Berger & Luckmann's sociology of knowledge: The Social Construction of Reality wherein there is rich discussion of "symbolic universes" (following Alfred Schutz's Phenomenology of the Social World and also his essay on "Multiple Realities" in the Collected Papers I) -- and of "conceptual machinery for universe maintenance" - (an amusing expression!).

The question, in regards to Hwang's use of the term "lifeworld" as a transcendently-constituted reality, is a provocative one that I shall have to ponder: "Lifeworlds are constantly sustained by a transcendental formal structure called cultural heritage" (Hwang, 2006, p 84). I have usually thought of cultural heritage itself as part of what Husserl and Schutz would call our "meaning context" - ie, part of the Zusammenhang (Dilthey) that Heidegger (1927) would call our "referential totality" within which all things find their place. Whether or not this would constitute a "transcendental formal structure" - at least in Husserl's sense, or even Kant's -- is unclear to me.

But thanks for the provocative discussion,

Scott

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 [Comment by K. K. Hwang](#) by Louise S. [2013, Jun 24]

Dear Carl and All:

Thanks Carl for his interest in my research works.

I already submit my reply to his article to Social Epistemology. The title of my article is :

The Construction of Culture-inclusive Theories by Multiple Philosophical Paradigms'.

Because this debate is of crucial importance for the future development of IP, please read my article on Linking Science to Culture and Carl's questions first, I will share my reply to his questions with you all,

as soon as I get permission from the editor of Social Epistemology.

Best Regards,

K. K. Hwang

 [Comment by Louise Sundararajan](#) by Louise S. [2013, Jun 25]

Dear All,

I am writing to remind you of Professor Carl Martin Allwood's call for a debate. This call started in 2011 with an important paper, "On the foundation of the indigenous psychologies" (Allwood, 2011), circulated on the IP list on 5/20/11. In this paper, Carl challenged IP psychologists to define "culture." Two years later in June, Carl picked up the thread again with his comments (Allwood, 2013) on Professor Hwang's (2013) paper "Liking Science to Culture." To continue the debate, I would like to add a few comments:

From among the many interesting contentions in this debate, I focus on one issue behind Hwang's distinction between lifeworld and microworld. My reading of Hwang (2013) is that he is claiming that there is a gap between life and theory, a claim that has a long history with Bourdieu (1977) being one of its eloquent advocates. By contrast, Allwood emphasizes the overlap between life and theory. If we understand Hwang's lifeworld in terms of culture as lived and his microworld in terms of culture as theoretically constructed, we may ask many pertinent questions concerning culture. Is the notion of a gap between culture as lived and culture as constructed useful or important for our study of culture? Conversely, what are the ramifications of the overlap between culture and science? To the extent that the lifeworld of culture is rife with "natural" attitudes and assumptions, as Allwood (2013) rightly points out, the overlap between life and science would entail a powerful impact of the cultural presuppositions of the scientists on science. The intriguing question for me is which of the "natural" assumptions from all these cultures around the globe have the most impact on psychological science. For an answer to this question, we may turn to Danziger's (1997) astute account of how psychology found its categories, and how it is the embeddedness in Western culture that "accounts for the taken for granted quality that so many psychological categories possess" (p. 191).

Concerning the gaps and overlaps between life and science, there is certainly a lot to think about.

Looking forward to our continued debate,

Louise

References

Allwood, C. (2011). On the foundation of the indigenous psychologies. *Social Epistemology*, 25(1), 3-14.


Allwood, C.M. (2011). On the use of the culture concept in the indigenous psychologies: Reply to Hwang and Liu. *Social Epistemology*, 25(2), 155–166.

Allwood, C.M. (2013). The Role of Culture and Understanding in Research. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective*, 2 (5), 1-11.

Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a theory of practice* (R. Nice, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Danziger, K. (1997). *Naming the mind: How psychology found its language*. London: Sage.

Hwang, K.-K. (2013). Linking science to culture: Challenge to psychologists. *Social Epistemology*, 27 (1), 105-122.

 [Comment by Richard A. Shweder](#) by Louise S. [2013, Jun 26]

Dear Louise,

I can't recall if I sent this to you earlier. But attached is the entry by Shweder and Beldo on "Culture: Contemporary Views" written for the new second edition of the *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavior Sciences*. I wrote this entry for the first edition and this is the updated entry for the second edition.

Regards,

Rick (Shweder)

 [Culture: Contemporary Views](#)

 [Comment by Marsella](#) by Louise S. [2013, Jun 28]

See attachment:

 [Discussion on Culture by Marsella](#)

 [Comment by K.K.Hwang](#) by Louise S. [2013, Jun 28]

Dear Louise and all:

Here is my reply to Carl's questions.

The link to the post is:

<http://social-epistemology.com/2013/06/24/the-construction-of-culture-inclusive-theories-by-multiple-philosophical-paradigms-kwang-kuo-hwang/>

Your comments are sincerely welcome.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any problem.

Best Regards

K. K. Hwang